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WHAT MAKES THE DEATH PENALTY ARBITRARY?
(AND DOES IT MATTER IF IT IS?)
CHAD FLANDERS*
A common objection to the death penalty is that it is arbitrarily
imposed. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the 1970s held the death penalty as
it was then administered to be unconstitutional precisely because the states
seemed to have no clear standards for who got death and who did not. In
the most famous passage in that opinion (Furman v. Georgia), Justice
Stewart wrote that the death penalty was cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning was cruel and unusual.
It is thus surprising that the Court and those scholars who push this
objection have done so little to articulate a coherent notion of
arbitrariness against which the Court s jurisprudence has fallen short.
Too often hard issues are avoided by resort to metaphor or slogan (such as
Justice Stewart s lightning or the repeated refrain that we should execute
only the worst of the worst ). Thus critical questions remain unanswered:
Can there be any arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty? Some
scholars appear to believe that any arbitrariness would be impermissible,
but the Court has not. And if some arbitrariness is permissible, at what
point is there too much arbitrariness so that it becomes intolerable? And
what exactly is wrong with a penalty that is arbitrarily imposed?
I hope to show in this Article that there are different kinds of
arbitrariness, some worse than others. Some arbitrariness ( extrinsic
arbitrariness ) may be more or less harmless, at least as a normative and
constitutional matter. Some arbitrariness, too, may be the inevitable upshot
of allowing discretion in various places in the law discretion which we do
not necessarily want to give up. In the case of the kind of arbitrariness that
is bad ( intrinsic arbitrariness ) the Court s death penalty jurisprudence
post-Furman has been dedicated to getting rid of it. Those scholars who
attack any level of arbitrariness as unacceptable need to say more about not
only what they mean by arbitrary but how much arbitrariness (if any)
would be acceptable. Without good answers to these questions, we may
wonder if the objection to arbitrariness is actually a stand-in for
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opposition to the death penalty itself, rather than to how it is applied. At
least, this paper concludes that the case for the arbitrariness objection has
not yet been made with the strength it has, for too long, been taken to have.
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INTRODUCTION
A common and persistent objection to the death penalty is that it is
arbitrarily imposed.1 Indeed, the Supreme Court in the 1970s held
the death penalty as it was then administered to be unconstitutional in
part because the states seemed to have no clear standards for who got
death and who did not.2 In the most famous passage in that opinion,
1.
The objection has been made most recently by Justice Breyer in his
dissent to the denial of certiorari in Jordan v. Mississippi. 138 S. Ct. 2567, 2569
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ( In addition, both Richard Jordan s case and that of
Timothy Nelson Evans, the second petitioner here, illustrate the problem of
arbitrariness. ); see also Singleton v. Norris, 108 F.3d 872, 874 75 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Heaney, J., concurring) ( My thirty years' experience on this court have compelled
me to conclude that the imposition of the death penalty is arbitrary and capricious. At
every stage, I believe the decision of who shall live and who shall die for his crime
turns less on the nature of the offense and the incorrigibility of the offender and more
on inappropriate and indefensible considerations: the political and personal inclinations
of prosecutors; the defendant's wealth, race, and intellect; the race and economic status
of the victim; the quality of the defendant's counsel; and the resources allocated to
defense lawyers. ). A version of the arbitrariness objection also did work in the recent
Washington state Supreme Court decision invalidating Washington s death penalty. See
State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 627 (Wash. 2018) ( As noted by appellant, the use of
the death penalty is unequally applied sometimes by where the crime took place, or
the county of residence, or the available budgetary resources at any given point in time,
or the race of the defendant. ).
2.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). As Justice
Douglas put it, [u]nder these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty.
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Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the death penalty was cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning was cruel
and unusual. 3 Stewart went on: For, of all the people convicted of
rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as
these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. 4
Although the Court subsequently found in Gregg v. Georgia5 that
at least some states had come up with standards that made the death
penalty less arbitrary and thus a constitutionally permissible
punishment6 the story of the Supreme Court and the death penalty
since Furman and Gregg can be read as an effort to make sure that the
death penalty is not applied in an arbitrary way. Still, some members of
the Court over that time, and many more scholars and litigators, have
maintained that the death penalty is imposed in an unacceptably
arbitrary way,7 and that the Court s efforts have done little to make the
death penalty less wanton and freakish to use again the words of
Justice Stewart in his Furman concurrence.8
It is thus surprising that, over the past fifty years, the Court and
those scholars who push this line have done so little to articulate a
coherent notion of
arbitrariness
against which the Court s
jurisprudence has fallen short. Too often hard issues are avoided by
resort to metaphor or slogan (such as Justice Stewart s lightning or the
repeated refrain that we should execute only the worst of the worst 9
rather than just a randomly chosen few). One question we might ask is
whether there can be any arbitrariness in the imposition of the death
penalty. Some scholars appear to believe that any arbitrariness is
impermissible, but the Court has not.10 Yet even if some arbitrariness is
People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12. Id. at 253 (Douglas,
J., concurring). Some Justices, of course, wanted to abolish the death penalty
altogether.
3.
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
4.
Id. at 309 10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
5.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6.
Id. at 195.
7.
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARV. L. REV. 355, 414 (1995) (noting that there remains significant arbitrariness in
administration of the "current death penalty).
8.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9.
A phrase used most recently by Justice Breyer. See Glossip v. Gross, 135
S. Ct. 2726, 2762 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ( [U]nless we return to the mandatory
death penalty struck down in Woodson, the constitutionality of capital punishment rests
on its limited application to the worst of the worst. And this extensive body of evidence
suggests that is not so limited. ) (internal citations omitted).
10.
Justice Marshall at one point expressed the hope that the Court would
one\ day take this view:

58

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

permissible, at what point is there too much arbitrariness so that it
becomes intolerable? And what exactly is wrong with a penalty that is
arbitrarily imposed?11
In addition to not giving good answers to these basic questions
about the nature of arbitrariness, the Court and scholars have also been
too quick to assume that all arbitrariness is of a kind. But as I hope to
show in this Article, there are different kinds of arbitrariness, some
which may be worse than others. And not only may some kinds of
arbitrariness be ineliminable, as I will also suggest, some arbitrariness
may be more or less harmless, at least as a normative and constitutional
matter. Indeed, a certain amount of arbitrariness may be the inevitable
upshot of allowing discretion in various places in the law discretion
which we do not necessarily want to give up and in some cases might
value. That the Court has sometimes assumed that all arbitrariness is
the same (and that therefore no arbitrariness is permissible) should lead
us to clarify the meaning of the Court s now decades-long struggle to
make the death penalty less arbitrary. In the case of those scholars
who attack the arbitrariness of the death penalty, it should make us
wonder whether arbitrariness is actually a stand-in for a deeper
objection to the death penalty itself rather than to how it is applied.12
In this Article, I want to challenge the centrality of arbitrariness
objections to the Court s death penalty jurisprudence. Much of this task
involves the work of categorization, although some of it involves
revising a traditional story usually told about the Court s capital
punishment jurisprudence. In Part I of the Article, I look at pivotal
cases in the 1960s and 1970s when the concern about arbitrariness was
first raised, and confronted. I start that story not with Furman, but with

[R]emain hopeful that even if the Court is unwilling to accept the view that
the death penalty is so barbaric that it is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
it may eventually conclude that the effort to eliminate arbitrariness in the
infliction of that ultimate sanction is so plainly doomed to failure that it
and the death penalty must be abandoned altogether.
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE 38 (1981); see infra Part I.
11.
The importance of this further question is inadvertently indicated by
Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, when they contrast arbitrary and
individous decisions to execute someone. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 7, at 391
( By making constitutionally relevant any and all traits or experiences that distinguish
one individual from another, the Court invites arbitrary and even invidious
decisionmaking. ).
12.
A point made more generally by Mary Sigler in her probing essay,
Principle and Pragmatism in the Death Penalty Debate, 37 CRIM. JUS. ETHICS 72, 77
(2018).
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McGautha v. California,13 the case that Furman squarely (if not
explicitly) rejected.14 In McGautha, arbitrariness was accepted, and
even celebrated, as something that showed the jury s power and
significance.15 Furman, though, said there was such a thing as too much
arbitrariness, but left an ambiguity as to what was meant by too
much. 16 In addition to McGautha, the key decision to help to
determine what the Furman concurring opinions in particular, those of
Justices Stewart and White is Woodson v. North Carolina.17 Justices
Stewart and White split in Woodson, and seeing why they split is
important to figuring out what, exactly, the kind of arbitrariness the
Court was most worried about in the cases culminating in Gregg. In
telling the story up to Gregg in Part I, I argue that the Court was most
concerned with what I call intrinsic arbitrariness or the idea that the
death penalty is arbitrary when it gives death to those who do not really
deserve it (this is Stewart s concern) or when it does not give death to
those who do (this is White s concern).
In Part II of this Article I elaborate on the idea of intrinsic
arbitrariness. The focus of a concern with intrinsic arbitrariness is on
the crimes that are subject to the death penalty, on the one hand, and
the characteristics of offenders who are candidates for the death
penalty. In Justice Stewart s version of intrinsic arbitrariness the one
that I argue carries the day with the Court the worry is that some
people are being put to death who are not bad enough or who did not
do a bad enough thing to deserve the death penalty. The death penalty
is arbitrary in this way when some people are getting death when they
do not deserve it and relatedly, that juries are not being restricted
enough in making the decision when to give death, precisely because of
the risk that they may hand out death sentences to those who do not
deserve it. There are two ways to attack intrinsic arbitrariness. One
way is substantive: limit the types of crimes and the type of people that
can get the death penalty. Another way is procedural: put greater
constraints on the people or institutions who make decisions about the
death penalty mainly the jury. The Supreme Court has gone down
both of these tracks.
Intrinsic arbitrariness is bad, even obviously so, and a real concern
we should have about the death penalty s administration, and I spell out
in Part II what I think this badness amounts to. If some people really do
not, as an underlying substantive matter, deserve the death penalty,
13.
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
14.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 40 (1972) (per curiam).
15.
See discussion infra Part I.
16.
See infra Part I.
17.
428 U.S. 280 (1976). See also the companion case to Woodson, Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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than they should not get it it is bad when people get something (e.g.,
death) that they did not deserve.18 But if we buy the Court s story of
our evolving standards (discussed in Part II), we are actually getting
better at not punishing with death those who don t really deserve
death.19 It is when opponents of the arbitrariness of the death penalty
push for something more beyond this story of progress that there is
something that remains wrong with giving the death penalty to those
who deserve it even though we don t give it to all who deserve it that
we begin to lose a grip on the badness of arbitrariness.20 It is here that
opponents of the death penalty need to say why there still remains too
much arbitrariness in the death penalty as it is currently applied, and
why that remaining arbitrariness renders the death penalty
impermissible.
In Part III, I develop the concept of extrinsic arbitrariness. It is this
kind of arbitrariness which, I think, scholars and other critics are
referring to when they object that the death penalty is still arbitrarily
imposed, and objectionably so, even when it is imposed on those for
whom death has found to be an appropriate punishment. Extrinsic, as
opposed to intrinsic, arbitrariness, deals not with the character of the
offender, or the nature of the crime, but instead on factors which may
so the objection goes represent an arbitrary basis for selection. So,
for example, it may be that whether or not you get the death penalty
will depend on where you commit the crime, what the prosecutor
decides, what your race is, or who your lawyer is. We could stipulate,
in theses cases where extrinsic factors are decisive, that the crime
18.
One may object at this point that desert is an incoherent concept. I have
myself suggested as much as this in other work. See Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism
Be Saved?, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 309, 333 (2014). But two points in response, the
former more important than the latter: (a) the Court does not think desert is incoherent,
see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005), and (b) I do not think that
desert is a wholly incoherent concept. I cannot argue (b) here (although see Flanders,
supra). It should be sufficient for the purposes of this Article that the Court takes desert
seriously, and the potential of putting a person to death who does not deserve it very
seriously indeed.
19.
Commentators have claimed that the Court gradually came to abandon
its concern with arbitrariness. But of course this depends on what arbitrariness is;
maybe the Court felt that it achieved what it could regarding arbitrariness and found the
remaining arbitrariness tolerable. Cf. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital
Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 390 (1998) ( Today, the Court
still acknowledges a concern about arbitrariness, and it is mainly in its results that the
Court has appeared to abandon such a concern. ).
20.
As should be clear, I am mostly concerned in this Article with those who
use the arbitrariness argument in service of an anti-death penalty argument. For those
who support the death penalty, arbitrariness is still going to be a problem, but the
solution is rather straightforward: give death to all who deserve it. Justice Scalia seems
to adopt this position in his concurring opinion in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
671 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and the offender are similarly situated so that, in other words, there is
no problem with intrinsic arbitrariness. But extrinsic arbitrariness could
remain. The extrinsic problem comes when we have two similarly
situated offenders and what tips the balance in favor of the death
penalty is some outside factor that is morally arbitrary, that has nothing
to do with the badness of the crime or the rottenness of the offender.
Again, as with intrinsic arbitrariness, we may have a feeling that
something is wrong about extrinsic arbitrariness, but this time it is
harder to say what precisely this is. There are some factors that are
extrinsic to the wrong of the crime and the character of the offender
that should never be the basis of a decision. This is where race factors
in. It is wrong to make a decision to sentence someone to death because
of his or her race. At the same time, it is wrong to arrest someone, to
charge someone, to prosecute someone, to sentence someone to
anything where race is a decisive factor. This is a problem not of
arbitrariness intentional racism is anything but arbitrary but a
problem of discrimination.21 When we turn from those extrinsic factors
that are themselves impermissible motives (for anything), however, it
becomes harder to say what the arbitrariness objection amounts to.
Does it amount to an objectionable form of arbitrariness that a person
gets the death penalty because he committed a horrible crime in a
jurisdiction that has the death penalty where someone who committed
the exact same crime in a jurisdiction without the death penalty does
not? It might be, but it is hard to say how, exactly.
When we clarify what the arbitrariness objection amounts to, it
seems less devastating, and in some cases not that much of a problem at
all. My suspicion is that the objection of arbitrariness at bottom
represents a disguised version of an objection to the death penalty itself.
Those who oppose the death penalty because it is arbitrarily imposed
are apt to oppose the death penalty generally (this becomes clearest
when we see that the solution to the problem of arbitrariness could just
as well be to increase the number of times the death penalty is given as
it would be to decrease the use of the death penalty).22 Where the
abolitionist and the arbitrariness positions meet and join is the idea that
we cannot really say when a murder or other crime is bad enough to
merit the death penalty that there are at bottom no standards to specify
when the death penalty is appropriately imposed.

21.
It is of course even worse when race leads to someone being given a
punishment that they do not deserve. But that would be a problem of intrinsic, not
extrinsic, arbitrariness (as I am using the terms). See infra Part III.
22.
Again, a point made by Sigler, supra note 12. See also BLACK, supra
note 10, at 156 ( People sometimes ask me, Would you be for capital punishment if
you were sure it were being administered with perfect fairness? The short answer, of
course, is that I would not, as the questioner, desiring to embarrass me, well knows. ).
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Ironically, this argument is almost the exact mirror image of the
one Justice Harlan made in the McGautha case the case I begin with
in Part I of my paper. In McGautha, Harlan rejected the due process
point that would later be successful in Furman by saying that we could
not tie down juries to any standards or rules regarding what crimes or
people were the worst and so deserved the death penalty.23 It was
impossible to guide juries as to what sorts of things made a crime or a
person worse than another. Harlan drew from this the conclusion that
there was no due process violation when states did not specify any
standards for the jury to determine who would get the death penalty.24
Critics today disagree with the conclusion, but seem to embrace the
premise: there is nothing that can really put one terrible crime as
worse than some other terrible crime, so any choice between them
must really be arbitrary.25 Indeed, the objection today adopts an even
more extreme premise. Whereas Harlan s premise may simply have
been about how hard is to specify the standards, the basis of the
objection today is that there cannot be any standards. This paper argues
that we should reject this premise. The death penalty has become less
arbitrary over the years, and juries are more guided than they have
been. The remaining sorts of arbitrariness are either ineliminable, not
that bad, or not bad at all. At least, this paper concludes that the case
for the arbitrariness objection has not yet been made with the strength it
has, for too long, been assumed to have.
I. BACKGROUND
The traditional starting points for analyzing the death penalty is
usually the interaction between Furman and Gregg. Furman said there
had to be standards for juries in applying the death penalty, and Gregg
showed that this challenge was not an unmeetable one, at least
according to the Supreme Court.26 But in fact it is better to take a step
back, and set the story regarding arbitrariness as beginning with
McGautha, an opinion which now seems striking in its tolerance and
even approval of wide-ranging discretion on the part of juries. It is
23.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971) ( The infinite variety
of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless
boiler-plate or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need. ).
24.
See discussion infra Part I.
25.
This criticism is most often made in the context of criticizing some
aggravating factors as hopelessly arbitrary (i.e., that it is impossible to say what
makes one murder more heinous or vile than another).
26.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) ( In summary, the concerns
expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or
capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the
sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. ).
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against this baseline of absolute discretion that Furman works
against, and finds (after merely a few years) to be intolerable. On this
story, Gregg ends up as the synthesis of which McGautha and Furman
are the thesis and antithesis. In particular, if we keep in mind the
extreme position of McGautha, then the rather quick embrace of
Gregg s seemingly tepid standards for guiding juries makes a little
more sense. If the baseline is literally no constraints at all (and this is
thought to be both a matter of what is descriptively possible and what is
normatively desirable), then it may be easier to see why some standards
to guide juries seem to be a major improvement. What is unacceptable
is total discretion, which allows an objectionable level of arbitrariness,
rather than some discretion within which the jury is still free to operate.
But if Furman inveighed against the arbitrariness that McGautha
seemingly endorsed, what did it mean by arbitrariness ? This is
harder to figure out than it looks, in part because the stand made by
McGautha was so extreme the Justices seemed content to say in
Furman that whatever arbitrariness was, McGautha certainly allowed
far too much of it. And so the language of some of the concurring
opinions in Furman is long on invective and metaphor and somewhat
shorter on analysis. Still, I do think that the Justices were more likely
than not talking about what I will call intrinsic arbitrariness the
arbitrariness that means that some people are getting the death penalty
who may not in fact deserve the death penalty. If this is correct, then I
think that the Justices were onto a real problem regarding the
standardless imposition of the death penalty. Decisions by juries really
can be arbitrary, in the sense that the decisions of the juries can range
so widely that some people will get the death penalty who in fact should
not get it.27 At the very least, the Justices worried that the current
system could provide nothing in the way of guarantees that this sort of
thing was not happening much of the time. I spell out this interpretation
of some of the concurring opinions in particular, those of Justices
Stewart and White of Furman in section A of this Part.
But what turns out to be the key case in understanding Furman is
not Gregg, or not only Gregg, but also Woodson and the related
Roberts case.28 In rejecting South Carolina and Louisiana s mandatory
death penalty for certain crimes, Stewart and White end up split in
Woodson and Roberts, while they were together on the same side in
Furman. Stewart finds a risk of arbitrariness present even in a
mandatory death penalty, whereas White sees in the mandatory death

27.
There is the same problem on the other side, too: juries may end up not
giving the death penalty to those who clearly deserve it.
28.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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penalty a solution to the problem of Furman.29 Stewart s opinion in
Woodson provides the insight into the kind of arbitrariness that most
troubles Stewart: that some people are getting the death penalty who do
not deserve it. The mandatory death penalty for murder does not solve
this, because according to Stewart not all murderers deserve death.30 So
we are thrown into a situation where we have to have some sort of
individualized determination (so no mandatory death penalty) but we
must guide juries enough so that their discretion does not lead to some
getting a penalty they do not deserve (so no unfettered discretion).
If we look at the kind of arbitrariness that Furman (in light of
Woodson and Gregg) was worried about as what I am calling intrinsic
arbitrariness, it becomes possible to tell a slightly different and to me,
more compelling story about the Court s battle against arbitrariness.
Part of this story is the conventional one, about making sure that juries
have standards in their particular decision-making process this is the
story of guided discretion. 31 Guided discretion is of course necessary
if you want to allow some room for jury discretion, but at the same
time want significant assurance that juries will not be sentencing
someone to death who does not deserve it. But there is another, equally
significant part of the story that involves the Court s death penalty
jurisprudence limiting the death penalty only to certain classes of people
for certain kinds of crime. If the worry is that the death penalty is
sometimes being imposed on an arbitrary basis to people who do not
deserve the penalty, then in addition to guiding the jury, the Court can
also choose to limit the jury s power, by removing from it even the
option to impose death for certain classes of offenders and for certain
crimes. In other words, looking at the problem of intrinsic arbitrariness
allows us to tell a rather unified story of the Court s death penalty
jurisprudence, one which I hope to begin to tell in this Part.
A. The Impossibility of Guidance: McGautha
McGautha is a fascinating case to revisit after almost fifty years of
Supreme Court opinions trying to rebut it and to resist its position that
the nearly complete absence of standards guiding juries in death penalty
cases is perfectly consistent with the Constitution. The frank tone of the
Court s opinion, written by Justice Harlan, belies what seems now in
29.

See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285 87; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 328 29, 331

34.
30.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285 87; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 328 29, 331 34.
31.
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 334 n.9 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ( Since Gregg v. Georgia, the Court s death penalty jurisprudence has
rested on the premise that it is possible to establish a system of guided discretion that
will both permit individualized moral evaluation and prevent impermissible
considerations from being taken into account. ).
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retrospect as its strong and even extreme position. Indeed, the
statements of the objection raised by the plaintiffs McGautha and
Crampton reads almost exactly like what was to be the holding a few
years later in the Furman case, viz., that the absence of standards to
guide the jury s discretion on the punishment issue is constitutionally
intolerable and that to leave the jury completely at large to impose or
withhold the death penalty as it sees fit is fundamentally lawless and
therefore violates the basic command of the Fourteenth Amendment
that no State shall deprive a person of his life without due process of
law. 32 The overall point of the opinion seems to be that there can be
no standards in the death penalty realm because there really are no
standards to be had. But we should be careful, because this could mean
at least three distinct things, all of which find some support in Harlan s
opinion, (a) that in fact, there are no standards that can distinguish
cases where the defendant deserves to die and those in which he or she
does not, (b) that there are too many standards, too many possible
factors for the jury to consider, so that to try to codify these standards
would be hopeless, (c) that jurors cannot really be constrained by
legislatures and by the courts, and we should not worry overmuch that
we cannot constrain them. I think the important thing is to see that
Harlan s position is not (a), and that it is close to a combination of (b)
and (c) but that the fact that his position is not (a) makes his overall
conclusion problematic.
Start with the distinction between (a) and (b). (a) suggests that
there really is, at bottom, no reason or rationale that could guide a jury
in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. It is really just
up to the whim and caprice of the jury for it is simply impossible to
say which kinds of crimes are really worse than others and which
deserve death. Many people have since taken this position, including
Supreme Court Justices and scholars. You may say that this murder is
heinous and cruel and other may disagree, and who really is to say?33
In the Godfrey case, this is precisely what the Court held about an

32.
33.

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971).
See, for example, Norval Morris claim about the decision in Gregg:

Involved in their decision is the stupendous and false claim that prosecutors,
juries, and judges can distinguish one murderer from another, not just in the
extent of harm done, the numbers killed, the manner of killing, or the
degree of preplanning, but in the degree of moral guilt of the killer. This is
a task fit only for one who sits on the right hand of God (St. Peter is
reputed to be able to do it with immense consequences), but it is a task
certainly beyond the ability of any one of us or even the abilities of the
assembled nine on the Supreme Court.
The Ultimate Nightmare, 21 FED. SENT. R. 272, 273 (2009).
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inhuman and vile aggravating factor.34 Short of a limiting
construction, such an aggravating factor gives no guidance to juries
because there is nothing really to the factor; we cannot say what the
standard is, because there really is no standard to be had. The broader
position would be to say that in general we cannot say whether one sort
of killing is really worse than another sort of killing, because we have
no way of really telling what makes one murder worse than another.
This is a sort of relativism when it comes to determinations of death,
and it is not Justice Harlan s position.
Harlan s position is that there are standards by which juries can
rationally decide that one crime is worse than another (or that one
criminal is more deserving of death than another), but that there are too
many and they are too varied, for it to be possible to list them all. This
position which is option (b) for understanding Harlan s position
seems superficially similar to one that holds there are no standards
(option (a)), because it looks like in both cases that we have to throw up
our hands and trust the jury; on the one hand because there is in fact
nothing at bottom that we can tell them about what to choose, and on
the other hand because there is too much to tell them. But the positions
are importantly different. The latter Harlan s position is not
relativistic, or at least not necessarily so. There is a difference between
saying that there are no standards to articulate and saying that there are
a great number of standards, too many to articulate. One has to do with
the existence of standards, the other with the ability to adequately
express in language or in a formula those standards. As Harlan writes
in his opinion, pointing to his adoption of the latter, but not the former
belief: To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal
homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood
and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability. 35 The language here is a little purple
and maybe exaggerated, but the point is not that juries are acting
without guidance at all, but that the potential sources of guidance are so
great and so varied that to attempt to put them all down in words in an
effort to constrain the jury is a futile task, doomed to fail. Harlan
quotes a report prepared by the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment to precisely this effect: No formula is possible that would

34.
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 33 (1980); id. at 433
(1980) (finding that, given the vague aggravating factor, there was no principled way
to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases
in which it was not ).
35.
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 204.
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provide a reasonable criterion for the infinite variety of circumstances
that may affect the gravity of the crime of murder. 36
But it is here, too, that some of the weaknesses of Harlan s
position begin to show. For it was the conclusion of the Royal
Commission not that juries could never be reasonably constrained, but
indeed that it was within the realm of possibility to point to the main
circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that should be weighed
and weighed against each other when they are presented in a concrete
case. 37 Even if we cannot put all of the innumerable possible factors
into a formula and place it in front of juries, we can still point out the
major aggravating and mitigating factors and let juries consider them.
We do not simply have to give up in the face of all of the possible ways
that juries could decide a death penalty case and give up; maybe there
are many ways one murder could be worse than another, but we can
point to the most important ways to juries. This may make the choice of
the jury at least informed by some considerations, if not wholly
controlled by those considerations. And in fact, it was this type of
solution this way of guiding the jury in its exercise of choice that the
Court would point to in Furman and endorse in Gregg.38 Why, then,
does the McGautha court reject the solution the solution put forward
by a report that (the majority agrees) correctly identifies the problem?
There seem to be three reasons, two practical and one normative.
The first practical reason is that any standards that the court or a
legislature could come up with would be minimal, 39 so tepid, that a
jury would not really be guided by them. The list would inevitably be
partial, with the result that a jury would still be left mostly to its own
devices the list could not possibly list everything they should consider,
let alone list those things which they positively should not consider
(i.e., those factors that would be constitutionally impermissible40). And
the things that would be listed would probably be the obvious things
that the jury was going to be considering anyway.41 The second thing,
practically speaking, is that a jury could always just to decide what it
wanted to decide. A list of factors that the jury should consider would
could not stop a jury determined to decide on whimsy or caprice. 42
So, a list would be unhelpful and possibly irrelevant.
36.
Id. at 205 (quoting REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1949 1953, at 208 ¶ 595 (1953)).
37.
Id. at 205 06 (internal emphasis omitted) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE §
201.6 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft 1959)).
38.
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 n.11 (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (noting the obvious tension between McGautha and Furman).
39.
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 208.
42.
Id. at 207.
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But these are not the only reasons the court seems to feel a list
would be wrong. Harlan also believes, as a normative matter, that we
should trust the jury, or at least, that states are entitled to put their trust
in juries. Indeed, the more grave the punishment, the greater the trust
we can have in the jury. In one of the more rhetorically loaded passages
of the opinion, Harlan writes that it is not wrong to trust juries will take
seriously the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a
fellow human. 43 Taking that responsibility seriously, jurors will of
course consider those factors suggested by the defense, and by the
evidence of the case itself plus perhaps any number of other things
besides, things which we cannot possibly hope to catalog ahead of time.
In the place of lists and rules, Harlan urges us to trust the hearts and
minds of the jurors. And so this gets us to (c) on the above list: jurors
cannot really constrained by legislatures and by the courts, and we
should not worry overmuch that we cannot constrain them. This seems
to true for Harlan even if we could codify and list some standards for
the jury to follow. We should trust the jury and its discretion even to
the point of trusting them almost blindly, by giving them no standards
to guide them.
The position is extreme again, consider the phrase untrammeled
discretion 44 as it rejects any type of control on the jury. And so it did
not take much in the way of a shift in the Court s attitude to get to
Furman from McGautha. The Court only had to see that the jury was
not acting in a way that showed that the jury s decisions across time
and across cases showed any real pattern or rationality, meaning that
Harlan s trust was misplaced. Coupled with this was the belief that
putting constraints on the jury could actually do some work: maybe not
getting perfect rationality in every case, but at least guiding the jury
away from impermissible factors and pointing them in the direction of
proper bases for their decision. Again, because Harlan s position takes
a stand in favor of no limitation on the jury, it invites the objection that
Harlan paves the way for random or arbitrary decisions. The jury is not
told what to do, nor is there any consequence if they decide for a bad
reason or for no reason at all, so of course arbitrariness is invited, if
not in a way mandated. And this was exactly what the dissent alleged,
with some force.45 What is more, the dissent correctly pointed out that
43.
Id. at 207 08.
44.
A phrase used by Harlan in apparent endorsement: In light of history,
experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible
to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce
life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. Id. at 208
(emphasis added).
45.
As Brennan began his dissent:
The question that petitioners present for our decision is whether the rule of
law, basic to our society and binding upon the States by virtue of the Due
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the distinction was not between totally controlling the jury on the one
hand and standardless discretion on the other.46 The question was
whether there could be some meaningful limits on that discretion, so as
to diminish the risk of arbitrariness, even if it could not eliminate
arbitrariness altogether.47 We might be able to incrementally make jury
decision-making better; at least, we should not rule this out from the
start.
What is surprising is that something like Harlan s position despite
vigorous dissents becomes the accepted wisdom of those who would
go on to oppose the sentencing regime inaugurated by Gregg.48 The
emphasis is on the impossibility of providing standards that
meaningfully constrain juries and this could be either because there
really are no standards, or because there are so many factors (and such
a risk of juries ignoring or disregarding them) that there can be no
possible way to meaningfully constrain jurors. So where Harlan
endorsed and to some extent even promoted the ability of juries to act
in an arbitrary way, and dissenters wanted juries to be guided and
restricted, the dissenters would in later years come to say things very
similar to Harlan, but now in a primarily negative register: juries
cannot be guided, ever, their choices are always arbitrary and therefore
the death penalty is unconstitutional. We can no longer trust jurors to
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is fundamentally inconsistent
with capital sentencing procedures that are purposely constructed to allow
the maximum possible variation from one case to the next, and provide no
mechanism to prevent that consciously maximized variation from reflecting
merely random or arbitrary choice.
Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46.
Id. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47.
Id. at 249 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ( Unlike the Court, I do not believe
that the legislatures of the 50 States are so devoid of wisdom and the power of rational
thought that they are unable to face the problem of capital punishment directly, and to
determine for themselves the criteria under which convicted capital felons should be
chosen to live or die. ); see also id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ( I think it is fair
to say that the Court has provided no explanation for its conclusion that capital
sentencing is inherently incapable of rational treatment. ).
48.
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
( For this reason, I remain hopeful that even if the Court is unwilling to accept the
view that the death penalty is so barbaric that it is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, it may
eventually conclude that the effort to eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of that
ultimate sanction is so plainly doomed to failure that it and the death penalty must be
abandoned altogether. ); Kirchmeier, supra note 19, at 458 ( The Court s twenty-year
struggle to attain this goal through regulating sentencing criteria has taught us that the
goal is impossible to attain and has left us with an arbitrary mandatory death penalty
system. As human beings, defendants are too complex for legislatures to design clear
and specific guidelines for determining whether the accused should be destroyed. Thus,
we are left only with the choice of executing all first-degree murderers or executing
none. ).
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act in the absence of clear guidance, and in the absence of the
possibility of such guidance (which both Harlan and later death penalty
opponents seem to agree on), we should remove the death penalty as a
legitimate punishment. How we get to this result will be the burden of
most of the rest of the paper to show. The next step in the story is to
see how arbitrariness begins to be seen not as an inevitability, or even a
good thing (because it means the jury retains discretion to choose freely
and to use its judgment), but as a real problem, even to the extent of
invalidating the death penalty. This is the story of the sudden and
abrupt transition from McGautha to Furman.
B. The Rise of the Arbitrariness Objection: Furman
Furman famously was a paragraph per curiam opinion joined by
five Justices, who filed five extremely long opinions.49 Four dissented,
while also giving lengthy opinions.50 The two opinions that I believe are
most important and I do not think that this judgment is all that
controversial are those of Stewart and White.51 These are the justices
whose votes swing the other way in Gregg,52 and so they bear careful
study, especially given that the ground of their objection is
arbitrariness, the focus of our inquiry. What is even more interesting,
given the focus on Stewart and White, is that they unite in Gregg,
agreeing that the problem of arbitrariness is more or less solved by the
punishment regime in Georgia, but they disagree in Woodson (and its
companion case, Roberts, decided on the same day), with Stewart
(writing for the plurality) maintaining that a mandatory death penalty
for murder still gives us an intolerable amount of arbitrariness while
White insisting that to the contrary, a mandatory death penalty basically
solves the problem of arbitrariness.53 Following the movement of White
and Stewart across Furman, Gregg, and Woodson will give us a handle
on what arbitrariness for the Court ultimately means. It means, I think,
something like what I will call intrinsic arbitrariness or the risk that
the death penalty will not be given only to those who deserve it. With
Stewart s position in the end triumphant, this position has to be
qualified a little further: arbitrariness is the risk that some will be killed
who do not deserve it; it is not primarily about the risk on the other
side that some will not be killed who may have deserved death. I will

49.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam). The
concurring opinions were by Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Stewart, and White.
50.
Dissents were written by Justices Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Powell.
51.
Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
52.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 58 (1976).
53.
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 280, 306 07 (1976).
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explain the significance of this qualification below, when we get to the
absolutely crucial (for our purposes) decision in Woodson and the
related decision in Roberts.
But it will be worthwhile, before getting to White and Stewart, to
briefly look at the opinions of Douglas and Brennan, who also raise the
problem of arbitrariness, at least nominally. Their opinions are
important in their own right, but they also show something which I will
be arguing later that sometimes opposition to the death penalty on the
basis of arbitrariness really is just a stand in for an objection to the
death penalty on other grounds.54 Douglas cites the rule against
arbitrary punishment, but in fact his main point of opposition to the
death penalty is that it in fact is not at all arbitrary that it falls
disproportionality on African-Americans and the poor.55 This is clear in
his imagining that there was a law that said explicitly that the death
penalty was going to be leveled on only these groups.56 Such a law
would clearly be a violation of the Constitution. But this is not, in the
end, a problem with arbitrariness. It is, as Douglas concludes his
opinion, a problem with the equal protection of the laws.57 It is a path
that would, in various ways, be blocked by the Supreme Court in the
following years.58 It is, nonetheless, a sound point against the way the
death penalty works in application. It is not, however, an objection that
is based on the arbitrariness of the death penalty application. If
anything, Douglas s point, is that the death penalty is almost the exact
opposite of arbitrary, in the way that it singles out for death certain
groups. (I will revisit Douglas s opinion later in this paper.)59
Brennan also mentions and argues arbitrariness in his opinion,
almost in passing.60 Brennan does in fact make a clearer claim about
arbitrariness, in terms that echo those of Stewart s opinion (and in fact
he quotes Stewart in order to endorse his argument). Brennan worries
that there are in fact no real standards in this area that [n]o one has
suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the few

54.
That objection to the death penalty is usually categorical, so that it would
stand even if the death penalty were made non-arbitrary.
55.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ( Yet we know that
the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to
be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised,
and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and
saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position. ).
56.
Id. at 256 57 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57.
Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58.
See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(suggesting that the poor were not a suspect class); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987) (rejecting race-based equal protection challenge to the death penalty).
59.
See infra Section III.A.
60.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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who die from the many who go to prison. 61 Here we see in early form
the Harlan argument now used in a way to argue against the death
penalty, rather than as means to protect the death penalty from an
arbitrariness challenge. If we cannot name any standards, how can the
death penalty be administered in a non-arbitrary way? How can we say
that any jury s decision to impose death in one instance rather than
another is reasoned? How can we say that this or that murder is really
more extreme than another? As with Harlan s opinion, I think this
position goes too far it makes a fair point, but pushes it to a point
where it loses plausibility. As if to recognize this point, Brennan at this
point draws back, and makes clear that arbitrariness is not the sole basis
for his objection to the death penalty, and indeed, that even if the
arbitrariness point is proven, the unconstitutionality of the death penalty
could not rest on a showing arbitrariness alone. I am not, Brennan
writes, considering this punishment [i.e., the death penalty] by the
isolated light of one principle. The probability of arbitrariness is
sufficiently substantial that it can be relied upon, in combination with
other principles, in reaching a judgment on the constitutionality of the
punishment. 62 In fact, later in his opinion Brennan uses arbitrariness as
evidence of other, deeper things being wrong with the death penalty
that, e.g., society will disapprove of an arbitrary punishment, or that an
arbitrary punishment is unlikely to deter.63
Of the two key opinions that rest almost wholly on an arbitrariness
objection, Justice Stewart s is the most famous. His metaphor, of the
arbitrariness of the death penalty being like the arbitrariness of being
struck by lightning, has been quoted repeatedly, in court cases and in
the scholarly literature.64 But the metaphor itself is rather puzzling, at
least on first impression. It is not, after all, wholly capricious who gets
struck by lightning if you are on a golf course or out fishing, for
instance, and there is a thunderstorm, the odds of getting hit by
lightning go up. If you are inside, in a bank, for example, the odds of
you getting hit by lightning go way down. It is not the same as a
lottery; indeed, it seems rather different than a lottery. It does not seem
61.
Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan here seems to depart from
his dissenting opinion in McGautha, where he strongly suggested that such a rational
basis was possible. As he wrote in that case: I see no reason whatsoever to believe
that the nature of capital sentencing is such that it cannot be surrounded with the
protections ordinarily available to check arbitrary and lawless action. McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 287 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
63.
Id. at 295, 300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64.
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ( These death sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. ); see,
e.g., State v. Cross, 132 P.3d 80, 109 10, 115 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
( The death penalty is like lightening [sic], randomly striking some defendants and not
others. ).
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random. There are certain things you can do to reduce your risk of
being hit by lightning.
But of course, Stewart has a response to these points as he does
when he clarifies the meaning of his example.65 There are many people
who are charged and convicted of rape and murder, Stewart says.66 But
among those, only a few and here he refers to the petitioners in the
case are among the capriously selected random handful upon whom
the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. 67 In other words, even
after we define the class of people eligible for the death penalty, it
becomes a matter of chance who gets killed and who gets to live. So to
bring it back to the lightning example of those who are at risk of being
hit by lightning, who actually gets hit is a matter of chance, a sort of
lottery. At one level, we may see lack of randomness (you may have
put yourself at risk of the death penalty or of being hit by lighting by
what you have done or by where you are), but at another level, it may
be just a matter of chance as to whether you are killed or not. It is at
this, the second level, that the imposition of the death penalty is
wanton or freakish, because only some of the group of rapists and
murderers, many who have committed equally reprehensible crimes,
are sentenced to death.68
The language here is important, because there are two ways in
which the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty could be worrisome. I
think Stewart s position on this evolves, so we should mark what it is at
this point. Stewart notes that there are rapists and murders who were
just as bad as Furman and they didn t get the death penalty. 69 This
suggests that the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty is bad
because not everyone gets the death penalty that deserves it why are
some reprehensible criminals spared, and others not? But one could
also see a worry on the other side, which Stewart however does not
articulate clearly (at least not here), which is that arbitrariness is bad
because some people get the death penalty who don t deserve death.
Now, this may be implicit in what Stewart says,70 but his focus seems
to be on those who commit crimes that are pretty much the same in
terms of awfulness, but who escape death. Of course, both of these
things that arbitrariness is bad because it represents both the under and
over inclusive application of the death penalty can be summed up as
the death penalty is arbitrary when it is not given to those who deserve
65.
I will offer a slightly different explanation of this passage later in this
essay in light of what Stewart says in Woodson. See infra Section I.C.
66.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67.
Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
68.
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
69.
Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
70.
I will argue this point in more detail in the next section.
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it. This phrasing is meant to encompass both the possibility that
arbitrariness is a possibly in applying the death penalty too little as well
as too much. As we shall see, it is a continuing risk of the arbitrariness
argument especially when made by abolitionists that it can cut both
ways. It can lead to the conclusion that we should impose the death
penalty more just as much as it can lead to the conclusion that we
should impose the death penalty less, or not at all.
Justice White also inveighs against the arbitrariness of the death
penalty, but he lies somewhere between Stewart and Brennan in how
much force exactly he gives to the fact of arbitrariness. At one point,
he simply sounds like Stewart and indeed may simply be summarizing
him. The death penalty, White writes, is exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes. 71 Moreover, White
says, there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. 72 But
where Stewart was at best unclear as to whether he was worried more
about juries imposing the death penalty too much or too little, White s
concern seems squarely with the too little side. Giving discretion to the
juries, White maintains, has led to a situation where juries are opting to
refuse to impose death no matter what the circumstances of the
crime, leading White to conclude that the experiment with letting
juries decide whether to impose the death penalty may have run its
course. 73 White does not explicitly signal that a mandatory death
penalty would solve the problem of jurors refusing to decide on death
for serious crimes but he does intimate that this might change the
equation. It would be a different question, rather than the narrow one
Furman presented, if the legislature had mandated the death penalty in a
particular class or kind of case. 74 He repeats the same point, more
specifically, later on in his opinion.
But White s position is not ultimately grounded in a pure concern
for arbitrariness. Like Brennan, White is concerned about arbitrariness
mostly as a means to an end. For Brennan, arbitrariness might be bad
in its own right, but the badness also pointed to other problems with the
death penalty the fact that a randomly imposed punishment would not
be favored by many, e.g. White is interested in arbitrariness for another
reason (also cited by Brennan). White thinks that when the death
penalty is so infrequently imposed, and when it is unclear for what
reason the penalty is imposed (this is where the worry about
arbitrariness most directly enters his analysis), the death penalty cannot

71.
72.
73.
74.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
Id. (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 313 14 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
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deter.75 The cruelty of the death penalty in these circumstances, says
White, comes when you have a punishment which, because of the way
it is imposed (infrequently and arbitrarily) cannot serve any purpose.76
A death penalty that is imposed randomly cannot deter. Or, as White
puts it, I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes before us are
now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat
of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal
justice. 77 Importantly, if it were the case that the death penalty were to
be more consistently and rationally imposed it could serve this interest;
it s just that White at the time didn t think that this was a live
possibility. So White s opposition to the death penalty is conditional in
a way that Brennan s clearly is not and a way that is clearer than
Stewart s is (although Stewart would have to say more about what
would happen if the death penalty were to be applied consistently). It
seems fair to infer from what White says in his opinion in Furman that
if legislatures were to make the death penalty mandatory, then he would
assume that, now, the death penalty would be serving its purpose (or at
least legislatures could fairly assume that it would).
It is important to see how, nonetheless, the worry about
arbitrariness that come from Stewart and White converge in Furman.
First, they both start with the idea that it is possible that some people
deserve the death penalty.78 Second, and this is important for what
happens later on between Stewart and White, the concern seems to be
that not all who deserve the death penalty will actually get it, because
of the wide latitude given to the jury. Two juries can look at pretty
similar crimes, but there is no guarantee that they will come to the
same conclusion as to whether death is merited. That petitioner Furman
got the death penalty and others did not cannot be given a rational
explanation. Third, this gives us the problem with arbitrariness that I
have already canvassed. Arbitrariness means that you have a process
where not everyone gets the death penalty when they deserve it.
Whether this means that all murderers get the death penalty or only
subset of them is a question that can be put off but it will have to be
addressed eventually. For now, the problem is that the way the death
penalty was administered pre-Furman cannot give us any guarantees
that the death penalty is being imposed in a way that we are sure that all
who deserve it are getting the death penalty. As I will put it in this
paper, this is a concern with intrinsic arbitrariness, or the idea that we
need to have a reliable procedure that ensures that the people who get
75.
Id. at 312 13 (White, J., concurring).
76.
Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
77.
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
78.
Again, I assume for the purposes of this Article that we can give some
coherent sense to the idea that people may deserve a punishment, including death.
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the death penalty actually deserved the death penalty, so that we remove
those cases where someone who does not do something sufficiently bad
is punished, and where someone who does do something sufficiently
bad is not. This is to be contrasted, later, with what I will call extrinsic
arbitrariness, which is a concern that even among those who deserve the
death penalty, external factors like race, or geography are dictating
who gets executed.
It may seem that Justice Stewart s concern in Furman is precisely
with extrinsic arbitrariness. After all, he says that there does not seem
to be any reason why Furman, rather than others who have done
equally bad things, is not punished.79 He seems to be saying, Here we
have a group of people all who deserve the death penalty, and there is
no reason why one gets the ultimately penalty and another does not.
He does not, in other words, seem to be expressing the worry that some
who do get the death penalty are not deserving of it. Rather, Stewart
seems to be saying that there is something inherently wrong with an
arbitrary selection process, even if it is a selection among those who all
are equally deserving of the death penalty. There could be two solutions
to this: one is to get rid of the death penalty (removing the punishment
and with it the arbitrary process that leads to it), and the other would be
to make the death penalty mandatory (thus removing any chance of
arbitrariness). If you wanted to get rid of all non-arbitrary selection of
candidates for the death penalty, you would have to go all or nothing:
either everyone who is eligible for death gets it, or no one does. You
are stuck with either a mandatory death penalty (White s position), or
no death penalty at all.
Surprisingly, perhaps, Stewart tries to steer a middle way in his
subsequent death penalty opinions which show that he is not interested
in eliminating all possible traces of arbitrariness in the selection of who
dies. His majority opinion in Gregg repeats his arbitrariness worry
from Furman, but says that the state of Georgia s statutory scheme has
successfully addressed that worry. While such standards are by
necessity somewhat general, Stewart concludes in Gregg, they do
provide guidance to the sentencing authority and thereby reduce the
likelihood that it [the sentencing authority] will impose a sentence that
can fairly be called capricious or arbitrary. 80 A carefully drafted
statute as well as automatic appellate review can be sufficient to
meet the risk of arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death
penalty.81 It will take a close reading of Stewart s opinions in Gregg
and Woodson (handed down on the same day) to see that the solution
Stewart endorses in Gregg is not a remedy for all kinds of arbitrariness,
79.
80.
81.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 95 (1976).
Id.
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but only the risk that a person who does not deserve to die will
arbitrarily get death anyway. In other words, Stewart in Gregg and
Woodson reveals himself to be concerned not with eliminating any
possible arbitrariness, but only with eliminating intrinsic arbitrariness.
If we are mostly interested in eliminating intrinsic arbitrariness, as I
believe Justice Stewart is, we do not have to go all or nothing. We can
have a system in which not everyone who is eligible for the death
penalty is executed, provided we have adequate safeguards to avoid the
opposite and more serious error: punishing some with death who do not
deserve it.
C. Defining Intrinsic Arbitrariness: Gregg and Woodson
What Gregg and Woodson did was, first and foremost, to clarify
what Furman exactly had meant. When it was handed down, with its
brief per curiam opinion and multiple and conflicting concurring
opinions, Furman could have been (and was) interpreted in two ways.
First, it could have been read as a command that the death penalty was
finished, over in America this was the interpretation that Brennan and
Marshall, and to a lesser extent, Douglas wanted and hoped for. But
Furman also admitted of a second interpretation, and it is this one that
won the day in the end. Furman could be read as a challenge to the
states to come up with a system of administering the death penalty that
constrained jurors, and led to a more uniform, and less arbitrary,
application of the sentence of death.82 In a way, and in retrospect, this
was the position of White and, especially, Stewart. It should be
emphasized, however, that at the time Furman was decided, a lot
depended not on what the Justices said, but on what the states did in
response to what the Justices said. If the states stood back and did
nothing, left their death penalty statutes struck down and void, this
would be a confirmation of Brennan s and Marshall s prediction that
the death penalty no longer comported with America s standards of
decency. But if the states fought back, and passed new death penalty
statutes, which in various ways tried to respond to the concerns about
arbitrariness made by Justices White and Stewart, then the United
States had not, in fact, given up on the death penalty. This would show
that the states still by and large wanted it, and all they had to do to use
82.
Justice Burger explicitly called on states to try to meet this challenge.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, J., dissenting) ( While I would not undertake to
make a definitive statement as to the parameters of the Court s ruling, it is clear that if
state legislatures and the Congress wish to maintain the availability of capital
punishment, significant statutory changes will have to be made. ); id. at 403 (Burger,
J., dissenting) ( I am not altogether displeased that legislative bodies have been given
the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility, to make a thorough reevaluation of the entire subject of capital punishment. ).
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Blackmun s famous description from many years later was to tinker
with it a bit.83 Of course, as we now know, the states took the second
course, with a vengeance.84
If Furman was a challenge to states to come up with a way of
administering the death penalty in a way that was non-arbitrary, states
responded to it in two main ways which is why there had to be two
sets of opinions on July 2, 1976, and not just one. Some states
responded to Furman with a system of what was called guided or
channeled discretion.85 Juries still had the final say in who lived and
who died, but they had to do so in a way that was informed by statutory
guidelines they could not be given the free reign that McGautha had
allowed them. But other states responded by making the death penalty
mandatory for certain crimes, e.g., murder, or aggravated robbery.86
Both sets of responses deal with the arbitrariness problem, although in
very different ways. And at a first glance, the second response seems
the more promising as a response to the worry about arbitrariness, and
even sensible. If the risk is that juries cannot be counted on to apply the
death penalty consistently juries in different jurisdictions, or even in
the same jurisdiction then the solution is to get rid of the role of juries
in sentencing. If the jury finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
crime say first degree murder then they have by the same token
determined that the person should be sentenced to death. The solution
for arbitrary juries at sentencing is simply this: eliminate juries from
sentencing altogether. What is more, this solution fits well with the
diagnosis and condemnation of juries in McGautha that there is no
possible set of standards that could reasonably inform juries in making
their decisions. There are just too many factors, too many subtleties, to
make a rule that juries could be counted on to follow (and it would be
unreasonable and even wrong to put them up to this task). But if juries
do not have to make that decision at all, then they a fortiori cannot
make that decision arbitrarily. Justice White one of the two Justices
who were concerned with arbitrariness in Furman blessed this strategy

83.
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ( From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored indeed, I have struggled along with
a majority of this court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend
more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. ).
84.
As one state Court noted in the late 1970s, The Furman decision evoked
a wide legislative reaction throughout the United States, with some thirtyfive states adopting new death penalty statutes. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383
A.2d 174, 178 n.8 (Penn. 1978).
85.
See discussion of Gregg and Jurek, infra.
86.
See discussion of Woodson and Roberts, infra.
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in his dissents in Woodson and its companion case, Roberts v.
Louisiana.87
But, importantly, White was in dissent in both of those cases. He
lost the battle of how to define the post-Furman death penalty
landscape. July 2, 1976 was Justice Stewart s day, and we have to look
closely at his majority opinions in these four cases Gregg, Woodson,
and their companion cases Jurek (for Gregg) and Roberts (for
Woodson) to get a better grip on what Justice Stewart saw the problem
of arbitrariness to be, and why he thought (a) that a system of guided
discretion would work to solve the problem arbitrariness, and (b) why
he thought that a mandatory death sentence for certain crimes would not
solve the problem of arbitrariness, and might even give us more
arbitrariness. The separation between White and Stewart can seem
surprising, given that they seemed to present a unified front in Furman.
That is, they both seemed to be of the opinion that the death penalty
was acceptable, but not in its current form, because in its current form
the death penalty yielded results that were wanton and freakish. But this
unity masked an underlying division about what the real problem with
the wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty was. White saw
the problem with arbitrariness as really a derivative one, because when
the death penalty was not applied with some frequency, some
rationality, it couldn t act as a deterrent. We needed predictability and
frequency in order to send a signal that serious crimes will be punished
with the most extreme sanction possible. If juries are just picking and
choosing at random who dies, then the death penalty can t effectively
deter: people may just take their chances. If the death penalty is made
mandatory, though, this solves the problem of deterrence. The message
sent by a mandatory death penalty couldn t be clearer: if you kill
someone after deliberation, then you will die. No margin is left for a
jury to randomly and freakishly give you life in prison instead of
death. In retrospect, Justice White s opinions in Woodson and Roberts
approving the mandatory death penalty fit perfectly with his worries
about arbitrariness in Furman. He didn t want to eliminate arbitrariness
as such; he wanted the death penalty to effectively deter, or at least he
wanted a system that could offer a reasonable reassurance that it could.
A mandatory death penalty would deter murderers, or at least could be
reasonably expected to deter them.
Justice Stewart by contrast seemed genuinely troubled by
arbitrariness itself. It wasn t that an arbitrary death penalty couldn t
deter it was that an arbitrary death penalty was wrong. It is only, I
think, in Gregg and Woodson that we can really see what Justice
Stewart meant by the wrongness of an arbitrary death penalty, and what
87.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 306 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 337 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
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he thought could solve that problem. It might be well, before we get to
those opinions, to look in full at the key passage in Stewart s opinion in
Furman, which he repeats again in Gregg:
Indeed, the death sentences examined by the Court in Furman
were cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted
of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the
petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact
been imposed. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
so freakishly imposed. 88
The language here is important, and has to be parsed with some
care. Three interpretive points bear mentioning, because they will be
confirmed and clarified in the Woodson and Gregg opinions; and they
will support, I argue, a concern on Justice Stewart s part, with intrinsic
rather than extrinsic arbitrariness. First, Stewart points out the
arbitrariness of the fact that some people who have committed the same
crime are getting death (the petitioners in Furman) and some are not,
without any rational basis for the distinction.89 Some have raped and
murdered in just as awful a way as Furman has, but they will live and
Furman is sentenced to die. This suggests that fairness and nonarbitrariness would require that either all die or all live i.e., that
either the death penalty should be abandoned or something like a
mandatory death penalty should be required. This was the conclusion
we were left with at the end of the last section. That Justice Stewart
does not go in this direction in Woodson is something that will require
some explaining; but we can begin by noting a second point in this
same Furman passage.
Second, what is left implicit in the quote from Furman is that
while many who have committed reprehensible crimes are getting life
rather than death, some who have not committed reprehensible crimes
are getting the death penalty. In other words, Stewart s analysis
comprises not just two groups of people, but in fact three. There are
those who have committed terrible crimes, and who are (justifiably)
getting the death penalty. Then there are those who have committed
terrible crimes just as bad as those who got the death penalty, and are
getting life. But then there are also those who have committed crimes
88.
Gregg v. Georgia, 425 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (alterations in original)
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
89.
Id.
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that are in fact less bad than Furman s and they are getting death. That
is, of those convicted of rape and murder, it is only many of them
whose crimes are as bad as Furman s not all.90 This has to speak, to
Stewart, of the randomness of the death penalty, when it is not just the
case that some bad people don t get the death penalty, but that some
people who are not as bad as Furman do. This suggests that a
mandatory death penalty may not solve the underlying problem of
arbitrariness, because if we executed everyone who committed a rape
or a murder, some whose rapes and murders were in fact less bad than
Furman s would get the death penalty, simply because of the fact that
they had raped or murdered. There would still be a kind of arbitrariness
if we did not reserve the death penalty for the most reprehensible
crimes; we still need some sort of selection mechanism to work. Again,
this point is by and large implicit in Furman, but it is there, and it
becomes easier to see it when we look at Woodson.
But there is still a third point, which sheds light on the first two
points, and which will provide one of the keys to Stewart s decision in
Woodson. For what Stewart focuses on in the Furman passage is the
fact that just looking at people s crimes may not be enough. Some have
committed crimes just as bad as Furman and they aren t getting death;
similarly, some have committed crimes not as bad as Furman s and
they are getting death. What Stewart seems to be saying is that if we
focus on crimes alone just on what they have been charged and
convicted of we can t get the information we need to make sure only
that those who deserve death really get death. Stewart does not seem
willing to rule out death as a penalty altogether. He just worries how it
is being applied. And I think when we read Furman together with
Woodson and Gregg we get this understanding of arbitrariness: the
death penalty is arbitrary when we leave it to the jury to decide who
gets death based just on their analysis of the crime alone, without
telling them that they have to consider, further, the circumstances of the
crime and especially the character of the accused. It is these additional
factors that can give the jury a non-arbitrary basis for determining that
this criminal should get the death penalty. This also explains why the
mandatory death penalty will not do, because it means that the jury can
only decide whether the person has committed the crime but not all
people who commit rape and murder deserve death. Those who commit
reprehensible crimes and (especially) those who are reprehensible
people deserve death. And we cannot just infer the latter from the
former only the jury can do this.
These three points are not obvious from Stewart s Furman opinion
itself, but they become obvious when we read the key passages from

90.

Id.
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Furman in light of Woodson. Doing so makes sense of Woodson s
concern with the jury s ability to look not just at the crime, but also the
circumstances of the crime and (especially) the character and record of
the accused. It is not just a note sounded once or twice in Woodson, but
repeatedly, and even movingly. In an important and rhetorically
charged passage, Stewart writes that:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense excludes from
consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death.91
A rational death penalty process cannot just look at the crime of
conviction alone. It cannot simply look at the fact that a person has
committed a rape or a murder, even if these crimes are in fact
reprehensible. A rational death penalty process must look at the
offender as a person and consider whether the offender as a person
really has the kind of character and record that deserves the death
penalty. A mandatory death penalty which just considers all people who
commit rape or murder as the same, as of the same character and
record, is arbitrary, because it doesn t distinguish the people who really
deserve death and the people who don t. It won t give us reliable
results, to use Justice Stewart s word.92 So North Carolina s mandatory
death penalty had to go.93 Juries must be forced in some way to fix
not just on the crime and its details but on the person, especially when
we are assessing the most serious penalty the state can give. There can
be no serious doubt that this person deserves death, not just that he or
she has committed a reprehensible crime. Any process that leaves it
open that a person who committed a bad crime and that s all can be
convicted of death leaves itself open to the possibility of arbitrariness
by which I mean intrinsic arbitrariness, or the risk that someone who
does not deserve to die still gets the death penalty.
Thus in Gregg, when Stewart returns to the theme of a rational
non-arbitrary death penalty, it is in the context of a sentencing scheme
that requires juries to act in an informed manner by asking jurors to
91.
92.
93.

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 305 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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consider not just the crime the person has committed but the
circumstances of the crime and the character of the offender.94 And
again, it is this latter point especially that Stewart was asking for
consideration in his Furman opinion who are these people who have
committed these crimes? What is their background? What is their
character? Are they deserving of death when we look at their lives as a
whole, or should we show mercy? Of course, McGautha contemplated
that juries would look at these factors as well but Stewart wanted
more. He wanted an assurance of a process that would provide a
rational basis for distinguishing who got death and who did not. 95 It
was only with a process that distinguished crimes based on the
circumstances of the offense and the character of the person involved. It
is in this way that we could make a rational division between those who
had raped and murdered and deserved death and those who raped and
murdered and who did not.96 Not all the people who committed a
reprehensible crime deserved to die, and it should not be left to chance
whether or not they might die or at least it should not be left to
chance. Georgia s capital sentencing scheme did this, or at least well
enough.
This is where Stewart adds an important and revealing
qualification to his decisions (Gregg and Jurek) affirming sentencing
schemes that rely on guided jury discretion. Stewart writes that these
schemes do not eliminate all possibility of arbitrariness. Rather, they
reduce the risk, in his words, of decisions that are wholly arbitrary. 97
Juries have to be guided through a process which makes things like the
character of the offender salient. We have to make juries tell us why
this person really is worse than the others, and why his crime was
especially bad. Juries may lie, they may not follow instructions, but we
owe it to try to guide them toward a rational sentence. 98 And that is
enough enough that we have a system where we reduce the
likelihood that death penalties are imposed capriciously or in a

94.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
95.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
96.
See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190 ( If an experienced trial judge, who
daily faces the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate
information about a defendant and the crime he committed in order to be able to impose
a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then accurate sentencing information is
an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall
live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a sentencing
decision. ).
97.
Id. at 189; see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) ( Texas
has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of
death sentences under law. Because this system serves to assure that sentences of death
will not be wantonly or freakishly imposed, it does not violate the Constitution. ).
98.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190.
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freakish manner. 99 Nor in a way is it bad to not eliminate arbitrariness
altogether. It is only necessary to put it within bounds.100 For
arbitrariness in one context can be mercy in another.101 And we should
not, Stewart says, let the possibility of an isolated decision of a jury to
afford mercy render unconstitutional those sentences imposed on
defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not create a
substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice. 102
II. INTRINSIC ARBITRARINESS
When looked at together, McGautha, Furman, Gregg, and
Woodson present a sort of dialectic. The thesis is that arbitrariness is an
inevitable, even welcome, feature of the jury system (this was the
argument of McGautha). To fully get rid of arbitrariness would be to
get rid of the jury something that is not necessarily desirable. Furman,
however, in the form of the two opinions by Stewart and White,
rejected arbitrariness, or at least the unlimited arbitrariness that
McGautha permitted and even championed. In doing so, Furman put at
least a pause on executions, until states could figure out how to manage
arbitrariness, to bring it in line with the procedural and substantive
worries of the two Justices. That s the antithesis to the thesis that
untrammeled jury discretion was acceptable, the thesis championed
in McGautha. In Gregg and Woodson, we finally get to the synthesis: a
way to allow the jury to exercise its discretion, but not too fully, not to
the point where they can act in a way that is wanton or freakish. This,
at least is the story that seems conventional and rather easy to tell. By
telling it, I want to press that the arbitrariness that the Court is most
interested in reducing or eliminating is of a certain kind, what I am
calling intrinsic arbitrariness. A process is intrinsically arbitrary if
it tolerates the possibility that someone may get something that they do
not deserve an arbitrary system is one that does not adequately filter
between the deserving and the undeserving. In the context of the death
penalty, Stewart s worry (as I have been presenting it) is that the preFurman death penalty regimes gave out the death penalty sometimes to
those who did not really deserve it, who may have committed a terrible
crime, but were not themselves terrible, or terrible enough, people to
get the death penalty. Some deserved death, to be sure, but some
99.
Id. at 194 95.
100.
F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness in Death
Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1113, 1122 (1985) ( [T]he constitutional model only requires stricter control on
arbitrariness in capital cases than in noncapital cases. Reasonably fair procedures, not
perfect ones, are the requirement. ).
101.
I will return to this point later. See infra Section III.D.
102.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203.
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deserved something less than that. The way to move past this kind of
arbitrariness was to guide or channel the jury, according to Stewart.103
Make them decide whether the crime was committed in a particularly
bad way, or had some other bad feature, and make them rule on
whether the criminal had a character that was especially reprehensible.
No system could be perfect, but a system at least had to put the jury
through its paces, to get it to provide a rational basis to show that death
in this case for this person really was warranted, and not a lesser
punishment.
If we look at the concern of Justice Stewart to be one of intrinsic
arbitrariness, we do not need to tell a long or philosophically complex
story about why intrinsic arbitrariness is bad. Intrinsic arbitrariness is
bad because it results in giving some people a punishment they do not
deserve. Just as it would be wrong to punish someone who did not
commit any crime, so too would it be wrong to punish someone with a
penalty more than he or she actually deserved. Both are, in a way,
forms of punishing the innocent. In one case, the person deserves no
punishment, and it would be wrong to give him or her any punishment.
In the other case, the person deserves not that much punishment, and
punishing him or her beyond the punishment he or she deserves
involves punishing out of proportion to guilt. The only concepts we
really need to understand intrinsic arbitrariness are the idea of deserved
guilt and the idea of proportionate punishment. A system that resulted
in meting out punishment not in any way correlated to desert that left it
to the unregulated whim or the jury would risk handing out punishment
on an arbitrary basis. Of course, that juries would act this way is in
part an empirical judgment.104 In McGautha, Justice Harlan seemed to
103.
This was not so for Justice White, who felt that a mandatory death
penalty adequately solved any worry about the arbitrariness of the death penalty and
itself created no new problems with arbitrariness. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
104.
To be sure, we need to get clear first on what we are measuring, so that
we might be able to tell when and whether the death penalty has become less arbitrary.
I think it is obvious that it has, although this is not a widely shared opinion, especially
among death penalty critics. See, e.g., Kirchmeier, supra note 19, at 441 ( The
system, however, is not much better, and many of the improvements are not necessarily
a result of the guided discretion system. Although the present system has made some
small progress toward achieving a fairer sentencing system, it has not come close to the
Eighth Amendment goals envisioned by the Court in Furman. ). Sometimes the lower
number of executions is used to prove that the death penalty is arbitrarily imposed,
so that today we have as much (or more) arbitrariness as before. See, e.g., Lindsey S.
Vann, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return to Arbitrariness in Capital
Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1255, 1268 69 (2011) ( Since then, the number of
executions throughout the country decreased to thirty-seven in 2008, fifty-two in 2009,
and only forty-six in 2010. These numbers are especially significant in light of Justice
Brennan s conclusion that a strong inference of arbitrariness results from the infliction
of the death penalty less than fifty times in a country of over 200 million people. Since

86

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

think we could trust juries to assess guilt and punishment without any
help, without any guidelines. We had to believe that they could take
this task seriously, and perform it reasonably well or so Harlan
believed. But experience proved this wrong, or at least Justice Stewart
(and others) thought. He saw juries giving out punishments that seemed
not appropriately related to desert. He saw equally reprehensible crimes
being given different punishments. He saw, more pointedly, less than
reprehensible crimes and less than reprehensible people getting death.
The solution to this was to make the jury prove that it was giving out
death only to those who really deserved it who committed the worst
crimes, and were the worst people, hence the result in Gregg and in
Woodson.
When we look at the Court s jurisprudence in terms of avoiding
intrinsic arbitrariness rather than what I will go on to call extrinsic
arbitrariness the vast sweep of its decisions in the past half century
come into much better focus. Of course, the validation of Georgia s
system in Gregg set the standard for the Court s subsequent review of
various similar statutory schemes over the years. But two other strains
of the Court s case law also make more sense when we look at them in
terms of eliminating intrinsic arbitrariness. First, there is the Court s
finding that certain crimes are simply not awful enough to deserve
death. Over the years, the Court has all but limited the death penalty to
cases where one person kills another person. It has gotten rid of the
death penalty for rape, even of a child, and it has nearly abolished the
death penalty in cases of felony murder where, although there is a
death, it is not a death that is intended.105 Second, the Court has also
restricted the death penalty as applied to certain classes of people.
Those who are severely mentally disabled and those who are under
eighteen cannot be executed.106 This second class of limitations
resonates most deeply with Justice Stevens interest in applying the
death penalty only to those whose character and record show the most
depravity. Some the mentally disabled and the young simply cannot
be said to have characters of this sort; their characters are not fully
formed, or not formed enough for us to pass judgment on them that
they deserve death for who they are. With these two types of
Justice Brennan drew his conclusions, the population has risen to over 300 million
people, yet the number of executions remains less than fifty per year. Accordingly, the
low imposition rates raise the same inference of arbitrary imposition today as they did
in 1972, if not an even stronger one. ). But this could another way, viz., the lower
number could also prove that the death penalty is being applied more selectively.
105.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (rape); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 797, 801 (1982) (minor participant in a felony murder); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 445 47 (2008) (rape of a child).
106.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (mentally disabled); Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (juveniles).
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categorical bans on death (for certain crimes and for certain people) the
Court does with an axe what it was doing with a scalpel in its Gregg
line of decisions. Giving the jury guidelines for how to decide which
person gets the death penalty, given his or her crime and his or her
character reduces intrinsic arbitrariness by getting the jury to provide a
reasoned decision that this murderer (say) should get the death penalty
and this other murder should not. But categorical exclusions do the
same thing, albeit in a sweeping way. They announce that the death
penalty should not range over some crimes and some criminals
because if it did, it would risk bringing in some people that did not
deserve to be punished with death.
A. Reducing Intrinsic Arbitrariness: Guided Discretion
The revolution in Gregg and Jurek was the idea that jury discretion
could be managed in a way that would reduce arbitrariness, or at least
make the jury decision-making not wholly arbitrary. Again, the sea
change from McGautha to Gregg is obvious. McGautha, at worst, saw
wholesale jury discretion as an ineliminable part of having a jury
system. To get rid of it was to put into question the whole criminal
justice system by putting into question the main driver of that system
the men and women who made up the jury. At best, McGautha saw the
jury as a positive force, able to make the fine-tuned judgment as to who
deserved death, and able to dispense mercy when it was necessary (and
even when it was unnecessary). Woodson was not wrong in seeing
inherent in McGautha an implicit condemnation of a mandatory death
penalty system, which would take the jury out of sentencing altogether.
But Furman changed all this, seeing in McGautha s tolerance of the
jury as, in fact, a tolerance for permitting the jury to make a judgment
that someone should die when in fact he or she might not deserve
death. Gregg and Jurek had to thread the needle of limiting the jury s
discretion without eliminating the role of the jury. They did so by
endorsing various systems of guided discretion, where a jury could use
its judgment, but not have that judgment taken away from it. It had to
give a reasoned decision. Some arbitrariness was inevitable, but what
had to be limited was the kind of arbitrariness that would result in
someone whose crime and more importantly, someone whose
character was not of the sort such that death was the proper
punishment.
The basic of outline of the acceptable and approved system was
this: the jury, after determining that the person was in fact guilty of a
crime has to go on to find at least one aggravating factor in order to
move the person from being guilty of a crime to guilty of a crime
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where death is a permissible punishment. 107 If the jury cannot find an
aggravating factor, then the person cannot get death. But supposing the
jury has found an aggravating factor, it then must go on to consider
possible mitigating factors and here, unlike was the case with the
aggravating factors the mitigating factors can be anything.108 The state
has to specify, beforehand, what factors the jury can consider
aggravating. When it comes to mitigators, however, the jury can roam
free. It can consider any detail of the crime, and of the person s
character, it wants. No limitation can or should be made on what the
jury can consider. It is here, as I will explain later, that the Court has
shown its preference for avoiding giving the death penalty to a person
who may deserve it. There is an asymmetry between the risk of putting
someone to death who does not deserve it, and the risk of preventing
someone s execution who may, after all, deserve it. The system seems
designed, in other words, to be lenient rather than to guarantee
justice.109 I will have more to say about this in this Part and the next.
At this point, however, it is worth emphasizing how the system of
statutory aggravators and unlimited mitigators would, in Stewart s
mind, prevent intrinsic arbitrariness. Stewart wanted a system that
would force the jury to give a reasoned response to the question: why
should this person get death while someone else who committed the
same crime would not? At the step of providing aggravating factors, the
system forces the jury to answer this question by specifying why this
crime or this criminal was especially bad. He did not just commit
murder, for example he murdered a police officer or he murdered a
judge. Or perhaps this was not the first serious felony he committed.
These are things that give a rational basis for saying why this person is
elevated to the level of being death eligible his crime was, in a way,
more reprehensible than other crimes that might be of the same type.
The aggravating factors provide the reasoned basis that Stewart saw
was lacking in Furman. It was not that juries might not have been
providing reasoned bases anyway, but we could not be sure, and that
107.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 07 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276 (1976). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), discussed infra
note 108.
108.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 ( We . . . conclude that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital
case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. ). Lockett explicitly builds
on Woodson s command to consider the defendant in all of his or her individuality. Id.
at 603 04.
109.
As David McCord puts it, the system is designed to reduce the risk of
overinclusiveness. David McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the Supreme Court s
Death Penalty Jurisprudence According to the Court s Own Goals: Mild Success or
Major Disaster?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545 (1997).
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was the problem. Juries were not explicitly required to think about
aggravating or mitigating factors, were not required to check off boxes,
and were not required to actually commit to a reason why this crime or
this criminal was really deserving of death.
But this is not the only part where the jury is forced to be put
through its paces. Even after it has shown that the person fits within the
category of the death eligible, they are instructed to consider whether
there is anything in the circumstances of the person s crime or the
person s character that might make death nonetheless not the
appropriate punishment. That is, they are required to separately
consider mitigating circumstances, and whether there are any (taken
singly or collectively) that would make death an excessive punishment
for this person. So the jury is really required to make two judgments at
sentencing, one more fine grained than the other. First, they must point
out why this crime or this criminal is especially bad. Second for a
sentence of death to be appropriate they must find that the aggravating
circumstances are not outweighed by anything, anything, that is
relevant and that is mitigating. What results, at least in Stewart s
estimation, is a sentence that is reasoned and not arbitrary, or at least
not wholly arbitrary. 110
What the scheme does, in fact, is to force a reasoned decision
making process on the jury s part. The jury in the first step has to find
an aggravating factor, and in so doing, decide that the person who is
facing death fits in the category of the worst.111 After this stage the jury
has already considered the character of the offender and the
circumstances of the crime in a way narrowed by the state s having to
specify which factors are salient. It is of course possible that after this
the jury s decision could be random. But it cannot by virtue of the
first decision-making stage at sentencing be wholly random. 112 It will

110.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
111.
Of course, to do this work, the aggravating factor must not be vague it
must actually pick out a feature of some but not all murders. Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ( An aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class
of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. );
see also Chad Flanders, Is Having Too Many Aggravating Factors the Same as Having
None at All? A Comment on the Hidalgo Cert. Petition, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE
49 (2017). For further discussion on the same theme (although taking issue with my
analysis), see Tyler Ash, Note, Can All Murders Be Aggravated ? A Look at
Aggravating Factor Capital-Eligibility Schemes, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
(forthcoming 2019).
112.
Thus I disagree with Vivian Berger s comment that it is hard to see why
differentiating among a narrower, more similar group of convicted murderers with
respect to sentence is less capricious than doing so among a larger group of less
comparable killers. Black Box Decisions on Life or Death If They re Arbitrary,
Don t Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L.

90

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

be the choosing who gets death among those whom the jury has already
decided deserve death. Indeed, after this, the jury s decision as to
whether to impose the death penalty can best be deemed a decision as to
whether or not to dispense (arbitrary) mercy based on any mitigating
factor it can think of, or even none at all. To eliminate the arbitrariness
here, at his stage, would be at the same time to give up the possibility
that the jury can show mercy.113 It would be effectively to make it the
case that all who are death eligible should get death. But the extra layer
ensures this is not the case, and in so doing adds another prophylactic
layer to the sentencing decision. Even here, where the jury need not
mitigate (as opposed to the previous stage, where it must find an
aggravator), it is as least forced to consider the possibility of
mitigation; it again puts the jury through its paces, to show that its
determination that this person deserves death for this crime and that
there is nothing that suffices to defeat the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances. It allows yet another layer where the risk of sentencing
someone who does not deserve death can be spared execution. This
pattern where the class of people who are spared is by design larger
than the class of those who deserve death is a recurring feature (at
least on paper) of the Court s death penalty jurisprudence. It remains to
trace that feature through an apparently separate line of cases, where
the Court has limited which crimes and which persons can be eligible
for death.
B. Reducing Intrinsic Arbitrariness: Crimes
The idea that the Court in its line of decisions limiting the death
penalty to certain crimes ultimately only murder, and probably only
first degree murder has usually been told as part of story of evolving
standards. 114 We (who exactly the we is has never been entirely
clear115) used to think that the death penalty was appropriate for all
REV. 1067, 1081 n.81 (1991). What narrowing does is precisely to reduce the risk of
arbitrary or capricious selection.
113.
See infra Section III.D, for further reflections on mercy.
114.
As summarized by Justice Kennedy:
The [Eighth] Amendment draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. This is because
[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily
embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its
applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
115.
For a discussion of this point, see Chad Flanders, Bridges and Ballots:
Comment on Levinson, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1097, 1103 (2014) ( [W]e can be defined
by how we vote, how we respond to polls, how we think after we have deliberated,
who represents us, what laws our representatives pass, etc. Or consider a more classic
variation of the question: are we fifty states, or are we a nation? ).
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manner of crimes and all manner of people. But we have grown in our
standards and our beliefs about the appropriateness of death as a
penalty. The Court merely endorses this evolution and follows the
wishes of we, the people in limiting the death penalty to certain
crimes. This narrative is not wrong, but it is incomplete. First, it does
not do adequate justice to the Court s repeated insistence that it, not the
people has the last word whether this last word is grounded in its
superior moral understanding, or just its place as the final arbiter of
constitutional norms. The Court does not merely rubber stamp what the
people say, although it does take that into account. The criticism that
the Court simply manipulates popular support or opposition to the death
penalty to its ends should be read against this backdrop. Popular
opinion can only work as a post hoc rationalization of the Court s own
judgment, not as the driver of it.116 But there is a second point about
evolving standards which I think shows the deeper problem with the
narrative that revolves around it. If the Court really is purporting to let
evolving standards drive the death penalty, and evolving standards is
determined by what the people do, then the people can of course make
their opinions known, at the state level, at the national level, and (what
is most important for our purposes) in the jury room. Justice Scalia
made this point powerfully in one of his many dissents to the Court s
use of the evolving standards paradigm, when he cites Matthew Hale
for the proposition that it was the jury who represented the best populist
method of deciding who really deserved the death penalty or not.117
The decisions that have the Court limiting which crimes and which
criminals can get the death penalty are, in the end, limitations on the
jury s power to pass down a certain judgment, i.e., that this person get
death for this crime. If we look at this in terms of the Court wanting to
avoid intrinsic arbitrariness we can make sense of these moves as
designed to avoid giving the death penalty to those who do not deserve
it. It is just a categorical restriction on the power of the jury, as
opposed to giving the jury guidelines: it sets absolute bounds within
which they can make their decision. The Court is saying, in so many
words, that the jury cannot make a rational decision to give someone
who merely rapes, or who is under eighteen, the death penalty. A
system that leaves these types of questions open risks being arbitrary,
because it means that a jury could decide to send to death a juvenile, or
a rapist, when it fact it would be unjust to do so. This is another way of

116.
See also William Berry, Evolved Standards, Evolving Justices?, 96
WASH. U. L. REV. 105, 145 50 (2018).
117.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Juries are especially valuable in instances where a line has to be drawn, but it is not
clear that where that line should be drawn (or whether it should be drawn at all as a
categorical matter). I return to this point infra, Part III.
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channeling jury discretion, but in a more radical way. It is not merely
requiring the jury to make clear the basis of its decision; it rules out
certain decisions altogether, because of a judgment by the Court that
some crimes and some people do not merit the death penalty. If we
look at things this way, then the Court s so-called evolving standards
jurisprudence and its jurisprudence around guiding juror discretion are
really of a piece. They are both trying to get juries to focus on only
giving the death penalty to those who really deserve it. Sometimes this
means requiring the jury to make explicit the reasons for its decisions,
to give a reasoned basis for applying the death penalty. Sometimes
this means taking some decisions out of the juries hands altogether. 118
The first decision in this regard was Coker v. Georgia,119 and the
difference between Burger s majority opinion and Powell s concurring
opinion agreeing with the result, but not the rationale is illuminating.
Justice Burger s opinion concludes that the death penalty for rape is
disproportionate because even though rape is devastating for the victim,
it still leaves the victim alive and life for the rape victim may not be
nearly so happy as it was
it is not over and normally is not beyond
120
repair.
So the majority in Coker finds that the death penalty is per se
impermissible for rape.121 Powell agreed in the case of Coker, but was
not willing to go to the extreme of abolishing the death penalty for
rape. Powell wanted to limit jury discretion in the rape context, not
eliminate it.122 If a rape is sufficiently aggravated, Powell said, he
would give the jury the power to impose death for the rapist.123 It
118.
The Court has summarized its recent death penalty jurisprudence in
roughly this way:
In sum, our decisions since Furman have identified a constitutionally
permissible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. First, there is
a required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed. In
this context, the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the
decisionmaker s judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular
defendant s case meet the threshold. Moreover, a societal consensus that the
death penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State
from imposing the death penalty for that offense. Second, States cannot
limit the sentencer s consideration of any relevant circumstance that could
cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this respect, the State cannot
channel the sentencer s discretion, but must allow it to consider any
relevant information offered by the defendant.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 06 (1987).
119.
433 U.S. 584 (1977).
120.
Id. at 598.
121.
Id. at 600.
122.
Id. at 601 (Powell, J., dissenting) ( The plurality, however, does not
limit its holding to the case before us or to similar cases. Rather, in an opinion that
ranges well beyond what is necessary, it holds that capital punishment always
regardless of the circumstances is a disproportionate penalty for the crime of rape. ).
123.
Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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should be clear that Powell s strategy is to apply the Gregg idea of
narrowing jury discretion, but this time to the crime of rape have the
jury find aggravating facts that make this rape that much more
reprehensible than the others. Make the jury give a reason for imposing
death in this case of rape, rather than the other case, and in the process
try to guide the jury to a rational decision. But Burger and Powell do
not differ as much as they may seem to even though one would keep
the death penalty for rape and the other would not. Both want to limit
the discretion of the jury, to keep them from sentencing a person to
death who does not deserve it. Powell employs a scalpel. Do not let the
jury give the death penalty in the ordinary rape case.124 Burger uses
an axe. There is no ordinary rape case, he says, or perhaps he believes
that the jury cannot be trusted to tell, reliably, which case is the
aggravated rape case and which is the ordinary case.125 The solution to
this risk which is a risk of arbitrariness in the application of the death
penalty could be to get the jury to try harder, or to focus. This is
Powell s move. But the solution could also be to cut out altogether the
possibility for the jury to act arbitrarily whether this means the risk of
giving the death penalty to an ordinary rapist or giving death to a
rapist, ever.
This point that removing arbitrariness can just as easily result in a
category exclusion of death rather than an effort to channel is even
more evident in the over 30-year later follow-up to Coker, Kennedy v.
Louisiana.126 Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion, himself raises
the Powell-type objection to getting rid of the death penalty altogether
in cases where the person is accused of raping a child. Why not just
give the jury the task of finding narrowing aggravators so that the
death penalty is only imposed on the very worst of the worst child
rapists?127 But Justice Kennedy rejects that as inviting an impermissible
degree of arbitrariness, citing Stewart s opinion in Furman.128 He
suspects, firstly, that cases of child rape are so intense, so horrific, that
a jury would be hard-pressed to rank child rapes that there is
something that could be called an ordinary child rape, as opposed to an
aggravated one.129 Second, and relatedly, Kennedy rejects the analogy
124.
Id. at 601 (Powell, J., dissenting).
125.
Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
126.
554 U.S. 407 (2008).
127.
Id. at 439.
128.
Id. ( In this context, which involves a crime that in many cases will
overwhelm a decent person s judgment, we have no confidence that the imposition of
the death penalty would not be so arbitrary as to be freakis[h]. . . . We cannot
sanction this result when the harm to the victim, though grave, cannot be quantified in
the same way as death of the victim. ) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
129.
Id.
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to individual aggravating factors for death, but not without raising the
prospect that individualized sentencing even in the case of the death
penalty for murder introduces an intolerable risk of arbitrariness.130
Nonetheless, we have some experience in fashioning adequate
aggravators and mitigators in the murder context, Kennedy goes on
and we do not have it in the case of child rape. 131 To start something
like this developing a list of aggravating factors and mitigating factors
for child rapists would require a great deal of experimentation. 132
But this is problematic, Kennedy concludes, because it means
experimenting in an area where a failed experiment would result in the
execution of individuals undeserving of the death penalty. 133 This is
the language of avoiding what I have called intrinsic arbitrariness.
Allowing juries to decide which child rapist gets the death penalty,
when there is a good chance that no child rapist deserves the death
penalty, means risking arbitrariness in the death penalty giving death
to those who do not morally deserve death. Rather than risk this,
Kennedy says he will not merely channel the jury s discretion in the
case of child rape; he will get rid of it, by getting rid of the death
penalty for child rape.134
In doing so, Justice Kennedy draws a contrast in Kennedy about
two approaches to the death penalty one of rules and the other of
case-specific circumstances. 135 Kennedy writes that there is a tension
between these.136 But the way I am interpreting the Court s moves in
Coker and Kennedy shows them just to be variations on the same
strategy. One can try to limit arbitrariness by giving the jury standards
it has to consider in applying the death penalty. But one can also try to
limit arbitrariness by removing from the purview of the jury the
possibility of imposing death for certain crimes, e.g., rape i.e., by
making a rule. The key to see both standards and rules as after the
same end is to interpret the (shared) goal as removing intrinsic
arbitrariness, or the possibility that the jury may give the death penalty
to someone who does not deserve it. In the case of murder, this means
giving the jury guideposts to make sure it is making a reasoned
decision. In the case of rape, this means banning the death penalty
altogether. Importantly and I will develop this point in the next
section the avoidance of intrinsic arbitrariness as Stewart understands
it involves arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty. It does
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 439 40.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 440 41, 447.
Id. at 436.
Id.
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not mean avoiding arbitrariness in who does not get the death
penalty.137 The idea is that we have to be able to explain why those who
got the death penalty deserved to get it. If there are some crimes for
which no one deserves the death penalty or (as Kennedy suggests in the
case of the aggravated child rapist) who may, then it may be best to not
have the death penalty for that crime at all. Doing so removes the risk
of intrinsic arbitrariness as to that crime altogether.
C. Reducing Intrinsic Arbitrariness: Criminals
In the same way that eliminating some crimes can reduce the risk
of a jury finding death a fitting punishment for someone who committed
that crime (by removing that crime from the list of death-eligible
crimes) so too can the Court categorically remove a type of person
from the death penalty. This is what it did in its rather conflicting and
sometimes meandering jurisprudence as to the mentally disabled and the
young.138 Saying that the mentally disabled and the young are just not
the right type of persons to get death arguably gets closer to what
Stewart was aiming for in his Gregg and Woodson opinions they both
go to the character of the offender. Severe mental disability and youth
certainly go to someone s character, especially as these two qualities
are articulated by Justice Stevens in Atkins and Justice Kennedy in
Roper.139 Being young, especially, means that one s character is not yet
fixed, that one is still in progress, so to speak.140 To punish someone
who is mentally disabled or young for his crime because the crime
somehow discloses his character is to make a mistake: there is not
present a fully-formed character to be held responsible, or at least in a
way that their responsibility would make them a candidate for

137.
This is basically the asymmetry (i.e., a bias towards not giving people the
death penalty) blessed by the Court in Lockett. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
602 05 (1978).
138.
For the cases involving executing the mentally disabled, see Aimee
Logan, Note, Who Says So? Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment by Science,
Sentiment, and Consensus, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 195, 201 (2008) (section on
The Long Road to Atkins ); for the cases involving executing juveniles, see Josie
Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging A Constitutional Campaign
to Align School Discipline with Developmental Knowledge, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 929, 933
(2009) (section on The Road to Roper ).
139.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
140.
See, e.g., Roper 543 U.S. at 570 ( [T]he character of a juvenile is not as
well formed as that of an adult. ). The Court says something similar with regard to
mental disability, except it speaks in terms not of lack of development, but impairment
of capabilities. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306 ( Because of their disabilities in areas of
reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the
level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. ).
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execution, rather than for a long stay in prison. Being young or being
mentally disabled prevents the usual inference from act to character
the act may not be representative of the person s character at all; it may
rather be the result of the influence of others or impulse, so that in a
way your character was not even involved. Such details of one s
character could of course already be invoked in the mitigating phase of
sentencing. Even before Atkins and Roper, that is, one could invoke
one s youth or one s mental disability, and one still can, if one s mental
disability is not to the degree Atkins requires or one is older than
eighteen. These could be factors that the jury can consider in deciding
whether one is the sort of character who deserves the death penalty.
The point, however, is that after these decisions the line is drawn
conclusively as to one s character: if one is mentally disabled or one is
under eighteen, then one simply cannot be the sort of person who gets
the death penalty. One cannot deserve death, period.
It is worth pausing to note how radically Atkins and Roper separate
the character features of severe mental disability and (severe) young
age from the facts of the crime. We can stipulate cases where a crime
committed by a person who was under eighteen or a person who was
mentally disabled was reprehensible. Suppose that a jury has also found
that the person committed every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt; suppose too that the crime was of a sort where
aggravating factors could obviously be found multiple people were
killed, or a policeman was killed, or the victim was tortured.141 Still,
even in these cases, the fact that the person was under eighteen or was
mentally disabled will be enough to make them ineligible for the death
penalty. One s character can be of a sort that death is not the right
punishment for you, even if your crime was terrible and aggravated,
and even if you had been found responsible enough to have committed
it. This is almost as extreme an example of character preventing the
imposition of the death penalty as one can imagine. We do not need to
know anything else about the person s character besides the facts of
disability or of youth. Nothing else matters nothing can tip things so
that you would deserve death, and nothing else is needed to show that
you do not deserve death. Certain classes of people simply cannot be
candidates for the death penalty, no matter what other features of their
character or crime that we can or cannot enumerate. They are
categorically excluded from being the worst of the worst. It follows,
then, that if we had a death penalty scheme where the mentally disabled
141.
Aggravating factors were found in both Atkins and Roper. In the former,
it was the offender s prior record and the vileness of his crime. Atkins, 536 U.S. at
308 09. In the latter, it was that the crime was done for money and to interfere with the
discovery of the crime, and was vile and involved depravity of mind. Roper, 543
U.S. at 557 58.
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or the young were included as possible candidates for death where the
jury got to weigh death for them (and consider youth and mentally
disability only as possible mitigating factors) we would risk giving the
death penalty to someone who did not deserve it. It is the same
structure as removing certain crimes from being eligible for the death
penalty. We remove it from the jury s consideration, because we are
confident that there is a line that can be drawn. There is no rape,
however aggravated, that deserves death. So too, there is no mentally
disabled person or person under eighteen no matter the crime who can
deserve death.
But to look at this comparison is also to discover an asymmetry. It
is not as if there is a continuum between rape and death. It is not as if
at some point a particularly gruesome rape must result in death. It is
different with mental disability and (even more obviously) with youth.
Start with the latter case, first. There is no clear, obvious line that
makes the person who is one day younger than eighteen have a less
than fully formed character (and so be less culpable for a terrible
crime), especially when compared to someone who has just turned
eighteen.142 And the Court s cases after Atkins have only confirmed the
concern that there is no exact science to determining when someone is
mentally disabled.143 How do we draw the line, so that we know that
those below the line should be excluded from the death penalty, and
those above the line can be subject to a jury determination that they do
deserve death? Such, of course, have been the questions of those who
have criticized the Court s decisions in Atkins and Roper. The better
solution, they say, is to leave all such questions to the jury, not only
because the jury better reflects our understanding of evolving
standards but because of the jury s flexibility.144 Here the scalpel is
better than the axe, because the scalpel can make these subtle and
refined distinctions that a categorical rule by its very nature cannot. The
jury can take age and mental condition as mitigating factors, and decide
on which side the person should fall, based on its consideration of the
evidence. The jury can judge those cases where a person who falls on
the non-mentally disabled side of the line but who does not deserve
death. But so too should the jury be able to determine that a person who
falls on the mentally disabled side of the line may still be responsible
enough to deserve death. When the Court draws a bright line where no

142.
A point made by Justice Alito in his dissent in Miller v. Alabama. 567
U.S. 460, 513 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) ( Seventeen-year-olds commit a significant
number of murders every year, and some of these crimes are incredibly brutal. ).
143.
See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 724 26 (2014) (Alito, J.,
dissenting); Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 54 (2017) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
144.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341, 349 54 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
such line-drawing questions are best left to the jury).
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bright line exists, it risks falling into its own sort of arbitrariness: it
puts some outside of the reach of the death penalty when it is possible
that they could deserve death.145 In other words, a categorical rule can
arbitrarily exclude some from the death penalty, by preventing the jury
from making its own determination of moral responsibility. And
because the line here is not in truth a bright one, but involves
dropping a pin on a more or less arbitrary basis, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the jury might be right that a person who is under
eighteen or mentally disabled (as the Court has defined it) might really
deserve the death penalty.
Answering this objection will allow me to further clarify the nature
of intrinsic arbitrariness, and how it works as the Court s goal in its
death penalty cases. The point of avoiding intrinsic arbitrariness is
avoiding giving the death penalty to those who do not deserve it, not to
make sure that all who deserve the death penalty get death.146 Inherent
in this is an asymmetry between two possible risks: (a) the risk of not
punishing with death all those who deserve it, and (b) the risk of
punishing with death those who do not deserve it (this is one way of
capturing the difference between the positions of Justice Stewart and
Justice White). As the Court has developed it, intrinsic arbitrariness
views (b) as the much worse possibility, especially given that it is
Justice Stewart s vision of arbitrariness that wins out.147 So the fact that
the Court s decisions in Atkins and Roper may result in a regime that
overprotects some of the mentally disabled and some juveniles who
may in fact deserve death is not a devastating objection. In fact, it is
something of the goal of the Court s jurisprudence in the area. If there
is a risk of arbitrarily overprotecting, this is better than a risk of
arbitrarily underprotecting. Intrinsic arbitrariness says: do not give the
jury the possibility of assessing the death penalty to someone who does
not deserve it. Sometimes the Court can do this as we have seen by
trying to get the jury to spell out the reasons this person deserves the
death penalty for this crime, by having the jury find aggravating
circumstances. But the Court can also do this by simply excluding a
large class of people from the death penalty altogether. It has done
precisely this in Atkins and Roper. The tension between the categorical
exclusions and the idea of channeled discretion only appears
problematic if we ignore the asymmetry implicit in the Court s
145.
See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 7, at 418 ( The most obvious drawback
of Court-imposed categorical exclusions on death-eligibility is the difficulty of drawing
lines that accurately reflect insufficient harm or culpability to justify the death penalty.
If youthful offenders are to be exempted, at what age should death-eligibility begin?
What standard should be applied to gauge mental retardation or minimal
involvement in the offense? ).
146.
See id., for a similar response.
147.
Again, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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decisions the
asymmetry
that
prefers
underpunishing
to
overpunishing and thought that it was equally bad if a juvenile who
deserved it did not get death and if a juvenile got death who did not
deserve it. It is not the worst thing if a juvenile who deserves death
does not get it; but it is the worst thing or very near to it if a juvenile
who does not deserve death gets it. To avoid the possibility that a jury
might extend death to the latter type of the case is why the Court adopts
the type of prophylactic rules it does in Atkins and Roper.
D. Further Cutting Down on Intrinsic Arbitrariness
There are further ways that the Court could continue on in this
line reducing intrinsic arbitrariness by limiting the risk that a jury
could give the death penalty to someone who did not deserve it. This is
what the Court took some steps towards doing as regards crimes when
it decided Enmund v. Florida,148 holding that the death penalty was
categorically not a proportionate punishment for someone who was
merely a minor participant in a murder.149 The Court went back on this,
a little bit, when it found in Tison v. Arizona150 that a person guilty of
felony murder was not per se ineligible for the death penalty.151 If the
death was foreseeable enough, and the mens rea of the participant was
one of extreme recklessness, then the death penalty was at least on the
table.152 Whether this in time will resolve itself into a categorical rule
against the death penalty for felony murders remains to be seen.
Commentators have persuasively argued that it should.153 At the least,
the Court has made clear in Kennedy that for the death penalty to be an
appropriate punishment outside the realm of very grave crimes against
the state the crime has to involve, directly or indirectly, the death of
at least one other person.154 Where the Court could go from this point,
apart from removing death as an option for treason or for felony
murder, is unclear. In the early days of the Furman litigation, some

148.
458 U.S. 782 (1982).
149.
Id. at 787 88, 801.
150.
481 U.S. 137 (1987).
151.
Id. at 137 38, 151 52, 157 58.
152.
Id. at 158.
153.
For a discussion of this and related points, see Guyora Binder, Brenner
Fissell & Robert Weisberg, Capital Punishment of Unintentional Felony Murder, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141 (2017).
154.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) ( Our concern here is
limited to crimes against individual persons. We do not address, for example, crimes
defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which
are offenses against the State. As it relates to crimes against individuals, though, the
death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim s life was not
taken. ).
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Justices observed that the death penalty could be reserved only for cases
of the murder of certain people, as some states had done police
officers were a favorite example.155 It seems more likely that the Court
would altogether eliminate the death penalty rather than limit crimes
eligible for the death penalty to deliberate or intentional killings of
specific people.
The path for limiting the death penalty as regards the nature of the
criminal is clearer, however. The Court could simply lower the cut-off
point for mental disability something it arguably has already done by
allowing adjustments for the margin of error.156 And the Court could
simply raise the age for being too young to deserve death, as at least
one adventurous lower court has already done.157 Again, the objection
that these lines too will be arbitrary is no objection at all of course
they are arbitrary, to a degree, but we want to err on the side of
excluding people from death, and so some degree of arbitrariness that
balances things in favor of life over death is a welcome consequence,
not an objectionable bug. The Court, too, in these areas has shown a
willingness to look toward both science and common sense in its
determinations, rather than to wait for an evolving standard of
decency.158 Its tenuous reliance on popular opinion was evident even in
the early decisions, but it has become clearer in more recent cases, such
as Moore and Hall, where the dissents took Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg to task for departing from looking at national consensus and
instead relying on the consensus of clinicians.159 And the Court also has
room to strike out in new directions for excluding certain classes of
people. One category of people which the Court has been repeatedly
urged to exclude is those suffering mental illness.160 Moreover, the
Court could further refine its exclusion of the mentally disabled by
removing the obviously arbitrary requirement that the mental disability

155.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 340 n.78 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ( New York authorizes the death penalty only for murder of a police
officer or for murder by a life term prisoner. N.Y. Penal Code § 125.30 (McKinney s
Consol. Laws, c. 40, 1967). ).
156.
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014).
157.
Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559, at *6
(Ky. Cir. Ct. 2017) ( Given the national trend toward restricting the use of the death
penalty for young offenders, and given the recent studies by the scientific community,
the death penalty would be an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for crimes
committed by individuals under twenty-one (21) years of age. ).
158.
See the critical discussion of this point in Sigler, supra note 12, at 13 14.
159.
See, e.g., Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2002 (Alito, J., dissenting); Moore v.
Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
160.
See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court s Evolving Death Penalty
Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 785
(2009).
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be organic, i.e., present before the person has turned eighteen.161 This
restriction has absolutely no basis in the Court s jurisprudence, and
seems simply an example of a blind reliance on an industry
definition.162
There is a final area where the Court could further limit the jury
discretion in an effort to avoid intrinsic arbitrariness, but the Court has
shown a striking reluctance to do so. In its decisions in Gregg and
Jurek, the Court endorsed a system of guided discretion where the jury
had to find an aggravating factor before they could impose a sentence
of death. The candidate for the death penalty had to have committed an
especially bad crime, or be an especially bad sort of person (a repeat
offender, for instance) to go on to the next stage where, although he or
she is death-qualified, the jury may yet choose to spare him or her. So
it would stand to reason that the Court would want to make sure that
these aggravating factors in fact really do represent aggravating factors,
that is, that they really represent things that would make a person fall
into the class of the truly reprehensible. But the Court has not done
so, or done so only in the most limited fashion. It has struck down
some aggravating factors if they are so broad as to encompass every
possible murder.163 So aggravators which require that the jury find that
the murder was heinous or cruel or depraved will be rejected by the
Court because they do not require the jury to really specify how this
murder is worse than others because every murder could be described
as heinous, whether it is a bullet to the head or a knife across the
throat.164 In other words, aggravators that require the jury not to do any
work will be rejected. But beyond this, the Court has not rejected an
aggravator for not really specifying a true aggravating factor, viz., a
factor that makes this or that killing or this or that person worse than
others. It has as we have seen made some categorical exclusions, so
that a rape cannot be itself the basis of the death penalty, and youth and
mental disability can prevent one from getting the death penalty. These
rulings may incidentally affect aggravators. If one cannot get the death
penalty if one is under eighteen, the youth of the offender cannot act as
an aggravating circumstance (as it arguably did it in the Roper case).
This is not the same, however, as going after an aggravating factor
directly. To take an example, why is it that using a stun gun to commit

161.
A standard endorsed by the Court in its Atkins decision. Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) ( Clinical definitions of mental retardation require
not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive
skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before
age 18. ).
162.
See id.
163.
See discussion in Flanders, supra note 111.
164.
For more on this point, see id. and the sources cited therein.
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a killing puts one in the category of those especially deserving death?165
To be sure, the use of a stun gun may serve to distinguish one murder
from another, but it does not seem to give the jury a rational basis for
making that particular crime eligible for the death penalty, where a
plain, ordinary murder with a gun would not be.166
It is important to be clear about the nature of the problem here. It
is not that some states have many aggravating factors.167 Many do, but
it may be the case that these aggravating factors really do pick out
features that really do make a murder worse than others. So it is not the
sheer number of aggravating factors that states pick out that is in itself
problematic.168 It is that fact that some of these aggravating factors do
not aggravate in any meaningful sense of the word. And this is an
objection that is grounded in a worry about intrinsic arbitrariness. If
Stewart s problem in Furman was that juries were not selecting the
most reprehensible crimes and criminals for death, then it is no solution
to give the jury factors that narrow the class of people who face the
death penalty that are not really tracking the awfulness of the crime or
the criminal. A jury that votes on an aggravating factor use of a stun
gun that is present, but does not show that the person really deserves
death is acting arbitrarily, and it is the aggravating factor that gives
them both an opportunity and a license to do so. They are acting in
accord with a statutory scheme, to be sure, and so they are following
rules; they are following a procedure. In that sense, they are not acting
arbitrarily. Nonetheless, they are working within an arbitrary system,
because such a system does not track the right things. It allows them to
sentence someone to death who does not deserve death. A scheme
which has pseudo-aggravating factors is going to allow a degree of
intrinsic arbitrariness they are, to use a metaphor, the crack in the
system that can allow intrinsic arbitrariness to creep in.169

165.
The example is from Arizona s list of aggravating factors. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D)(22) (2018) ( The defendant used a remote stun gun or an
authorized remote stun gun in the commission of the offense. ).
166.
See also BLACK, supra note 10, at 154 (citing Texas aggravating factor of
killing a candidate for lieutenant governor ).
167.
On this, see Flanders, supra note 111; see also the excellent essay by
Chelsea Creo Sharon, The Most Deserving of Death: The Narrowing Requirement
and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223 (2011).
168.
Flanders, supra note 111.
169.
Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem:
Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 82 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999)
( [N]ew aggravating circumstances have been added to capital statutes, like Christmas
tree ornaments. These new factors reveal a process self-consciously freed from the
dictates of substantive Supreme Court review. ).
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III. EXTRINSIC ARBITRARINESS
Intrinsic arbitrariness is when there is a chance that a punishment
will go to someone who does not deserve it. The wrongness of such a
punishment is obvious, or should be, so long as we believe in
something like desert. In a death penalty scheme that involves intrinsic
arbitrariness such as existed pre-Furman and pre-Gregg the jury is
given a nearly wholly free hand to impose the death penalty, on those
who truly deserve and on those who do not. Those who get death when
they deserve something else, e.g., life in prison, are being treated
unjustly. The argument of my paper so far is that the Supreme Court s
jurisprudence starting with McGautha and extending to the present
day including its jurisprudence of evolving standards of decency
can be understood as an effort to combat intrinsic arbitrariness. The
Court does this in two ways, one more aggressive than the other: first,
by limiting those crimes and criminals who can get the death penalty,
by categorically excluding some crimes and some criminals altogether
and second, by channeling the jury s discretion in those cases (probably
just murder cases) where death is an option, by making them find an
aggravating factor and to consider all possible mitigating factors. The
resulting scheme, if it works, is one where the risk of the jury giving
the death penalty to a person who does not deserve it is, if not
eliminated, at least severely cut down. Some resulting sentences of
death may be arbitrary. Certainly, there may be cases possibly
many where a person does not get death when he or she could be said
to deserve death. But the greater worry and the one the system is
designed to curb is where a person who does not deserve death gets it.
This may still happen, but the Court has worked to make this happen
less, while continuing to affirm the constitutional validity of the death
penalty.
So much for intrinsic arbitrariness. Is there another kind of
arbitrariness that the Court could have been concerned with? There is,
although I want to suggest in this Part that it is a concern mostly raised
by commentators and litigators, and not primarily by the Court.170 This
is a concern with something I will call extrinsic arbitrariness. In the
way I will be using that term throughout this part, extrinsic
arbitrariness refers to a choice made among those who can be said to
deserve death based on factors external to the circumstances of the
crime or the character of the offender. For example, suppose that we
have two criminals, both who have similar and extensive criminal
170.
See the sources cited infra, notes 206 212. Breyer is the one exception,
but he has not been careful to distinguish between types of arbitrariness. The recent
Washington Supreme Court case, State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621 (Wash. 2018), is
similarly ambiguous. See infra note 213.
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records and who have both engaged in mass murder. Suppose, that is,
that both meet the first stage test of the Gregg test they have
committed a pretty bad crime, and they have pretty bad characters.
They can be said to be among the most reprehensible. And let us
stipulate that in neither case are there mitigating factors that would
outweigh the aggravating factors of their crimes and their persons.
They meet, then, stage two of the Gregg scheme as well. Extrinsic
arbitrariness comes in when it turns out that one person gets death and
one does not, because (for example) in one case the jury was prompted
by the one defendant s brown eyes to impose death. Here we have a
case where it can be said that the fact that one defendant got death and
the other did not was arbitrary. It was a matter of one jury s almost
whimsical and capricious decision to execute a defendant based merely
on the color of his eyes. Now, it is possible for extrinsic and intrinsic
arbitrariness to overlap. There could be cases where a jury decides to
give a defendant death because he is ugly even though the defendant did
not really deserve death (maybe there were overwhelming mitigating
factors that the jury did not consider because they found the defendant
ugly). But I will not be so much concerned with this case, because I
want to isolate as much as I can the phenomenon of extrinsic
arbitrariness, as in the case where the final decision to impose death is
made on the basis of non-desert factors even though there is a sense in
which the defendant does deserve death that is, the punishment would
not be intrinsically arbitrary.
Earlier in this paper (in Part II), I read Justice Stewart s famous
lightning passage as involving a critique of intrinsic arbitrariness,
especially when read in conjunction with Gregg and Woodson. But it
can also be read as condemning extrinsic arbitrariness as well,
something I also intimated in Part I. Consider what I take to be the key
passage from his opinion: For, of all the people convicted of rapes and
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. 171 Before, I
focused on the idea that the class of those who received a sentence of
death could include those who did not deserve death and so their
punishment was intrinsically arbitrary. Some got a punishment they did
not deserve, and courts were tolerating a system that allowed this. Yet
if we look at the passage again, it seems to condemn a scheme where
the people and their crimes are just as reprehensible, and one person
gets death and the other does not. That is, a system would be capricious
and random if even among those who deserve death, the way jurors
decided one person should get death and the other did not was based on
171.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 10 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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factors apart from desert. It would be like, in the words of Justice
Brennan, a lottery system. 172
A sentencing system would be bad, on this reading of the passage,
if there was no good reason we could point to where one person got
death and the other did not, even if we could agree that both people did
equally bad things and were equally bad persons. According to this
interpretation, Stewart may have been interested in intrinsic
arbitrariness, but he was also interested in extrinsic arbitrariness. He
was worried about a system that allowed juries the leeway to pick and
choose who got to die for any reason or for no reason, even if we
stipulated that the jury was picking and choosing among those who
deserved death. Note that it is not at all clear that a system of channeled
discretion would or even could solve this problem. For even after juries
had looked at the aggravating and mitigating factors, and found that
death was appropriate, a system of channeled discretion might still
result in a final, arbitrary decision that one person should die and one
should not even if the jury had checked all the boxes as to desert. It
seems that the only solution to the problem of extrinsic arbitrariness in
giving the death penalty would be to remove the decision from the jury,
either by a mandatory death penalty or by getting rid of the death
penalty. The fact that Justice Stewart rejected both of these options
makes me think that he was not primarily worried about extrinsic
arbitrariness; maybe it was not ideal, but it could be tolerated (this is
why it was sufficient that a system be not wholly arbitrary, for
Stewart). Intrinsic arbitrariness was more of a problem for Stewart, and
too much of it meant that the death penalty was unconstitutionally cruel
and unusual.
Still, we can examine extrinsic arbitrariness and look at it as a
problem with the death penalty. Surely there is something wrong with a
jury that bases its ultimate decision as to who lives and who dies not on
anything desert related, but on factors wholly unrelated to desert the
color of a defendant s hair or even the flip of a coin. I agree that there
is something worrisome about extrinsic arbitrariness but it is hard to pin
down what it is, exactly. I think, and will argue in this Part, that in
many cases a worry about extrinsic arbitrariness is in fact a disguised
worry about intrinsic arbitrariness. In other cases, the worry about
extrinsic arbitrariness is in fact a worry about some other important
thing such as lack of good legal representation or racism.173 In fact,
172.
Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) ( When the punishment of death is
inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion
is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little
more than a lottery system. ). I discuss the lottery metaphor in note 225.
173.
There is a third possibility, which I return to in my conclusion: that a
complaint about any extrinsic arbitrariness is in fact a disguised objection to the death
penalty tout court.
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these things (lack of good representation and racism) are very bad
things, and inherently bad things, but they are bad things that are
separable from the wrong of extrinsic arbitrariness. Having a bad
lawyer is a bad thing whether or not you are guilty of the crime
charged, and so too is racism in any part of a criminal proceeding.
It may be helpful, in order to narrow the focus on the wrongness
of extrinsic arbitrariness, to start with those things that are extrinsically
arbitrary and are bad, but their badness is not because of their extrinsic
arbitrariness. The two main examples in the literature are when some
get the death penalty and some do not because of a) their race and b)
the effectiveness (actually the lack of effectiveness) of their counsel. I
will then go on to discuss those cases where we do have pure
extrinsic arbitrariness, and where the arbitrariness appears problematic
in its own right such as when certain jurisdictions pursue the death
penalty with special vigor, and others do not, so that whether or not
you get death can depend mainly on where you live and not just on who
you are and what you did. I will then conclude this Part with a
reflection on the relationship between jury discretion, mercy, and
extrinsic arbitrariness. For I suspect that the only way to truly reduce
extrinsic arbitrariness would be to radically restrict the ability of the
jury to use its discretion, which may not always be a good thing. It may
be that we want the jury to arbitrarily spare some people from death
based on non-desert factors, even when death would be a just
punishment. We can call this extrinsic arbitrariness, but we might also
want to call it mercifulness.
A. Extrinsic Arbitrariness: Race
Race is frequently invoked in the same breath when the death
penalty is criticized as arbitrary. In fact, sometimes it is precisely what
is meant when the death penalty is criticized as arbitrary. The death
penalty, it is claimed, is arbitrarily imposed on people based on their
race. At first, this claim can seem puzzling, for reasons I canvassed in
Part I.174 In one sense, to say that the death penalty is imposed on the
basis of race seems to be the opposite of saying that the death penalty is
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner indeed, the problem is
that it is not! It is imposed based on and because of people s race.
So it may be better, if one means that the death penalty is arbitrary
because it is imposed primarily on the basis of race to say that the death
penalty is instead discriminatory. It was on this basis that Justice
Douglas opposed the death penalty in Furman.175 He thought that it was
obvious that the death penalty discriminated based on class and race,
174.
175.

See supra Part I.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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and was unconstitutional on this basis. Death penalty statutes, Douglas
said, were pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an
ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws
that is implicit in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments. 176
Douglas linked this idea to the death penalty being unusual, but it is
for good reason that Douglas is not usually linked with Stewart and
White and their objections to the death penalty. For one, Douglas
seemed more likely to see the death penalty as hopelessly
unconstitutional and not capable of a statutory fix. But secondly, the
objection that the death penalty is racist is not the same as saying that
the death penalty is arbitrary. Arbitrariness goes more with randomness
than racism does. To say that the death penalty is racist shows
something much more sinister than randomness. It shows and Douglas
certainly thought this was the case a desire, conscious or unconscious,
to impose the penalty systematically on those who were poor and those
who were black.177
But this may be too quick, because there may be a way to look at
the use of race in death penalty decisions that is different than the way
Douglas uses it in his Furman concurring opinion. It is true that there is
one sense in which a discriminatory choice is the opposite of an
arbitrary choice.178 But there is another sense in which when a jury
decides to assess a punishment on a person on the basis of their race,
they are acting arbitrarily they are letting a morally arbitrary factor do
work for them, when it should not. And indeed, consider how race may
make a difference in sentencing so that the difference it makes is a
matter of intrinsic arbitrariness. A jury may fail to weigh adequately a
set of mitigators because they are racist because they let a defendant s
race weigh in the balance, either implicitly or explicitly, against the
mitigating factors. The result would be a punishment that the defendant
did not deserve, and all because a morally irrelevant factor guided the
jury in its decision-making process. If we thought that race was doing
this in many death penalty cases, we might worry in fact that the
influence of race was making the death penalty arbitrary, in the sense
of intrinsic arbitrariness. Race was influencing jurors to assess the
death penalty against those who did not, in fact, deserve it. The
argument made in McCleskey v. Kemp, in fact, can be seen as pressing
176.
Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
177.
This explains why his concurring opinion concludes on an equal
protection note rather than a cruel and unusual note. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
178.
See generally Richard W. Garnett, Confusion about Discrimination,
PUBLIC DISCOURSE (April 5, 2012) ( Discrimination, after all, is just another word for
decision-making, for choosing and acting in accord with or with reference to particular
criteria. ),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/04/5151/
[https://perma.cc/S2YD-VF4J].
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precisely this point.179 Statistics showed that black perpetrators who had
white victims were much more likely to get the death penalty.180 That
is, as a general matter, race was having an effect on who got the death
penalty, and if this is so, then we might legitimately worry that in some
cases a person who did not deserve death was nonetheless sentenced to
death because of racial bias. Allowing race to creep in like that and
affect juries meant risking intrinsic arbitrariness.
Of course, the Court in McCleskey rejected this argument. The
Court held that so long as you could not prove racism in this particular
case, then there was no viable claim of racial bias.181 Statistics showed
that on whole juries were racist; but they could not prove that this jury
assessing this person for this crime was in fact racist.182 No study could
show this; only interviews with the jurors could, although even that is
hard to imagine. Perhaps one would have to make a sort of experiment
where the exact same jury heard the exact same facts, with only the
races reversed, and see if they would get to the same judgment.
Moreover, the Court continued in its opinion, to effectively eliminate
the possibility that race would come into the jury s mind would mean
effectively getting rid of the jury s discretion to impose death. 183 We
can require, the Court said, individual jurors to focus their collective
judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal
defendant 184 this is what the Gregg line of decisions required, of
course but we cannot guarantee that the jury s exercise of discretion
will be free of racial bias, although we should not presume that it will
have racial bias.185 Again, there is a point where the only satisfactory
remedy to abuses of jury discretion is a mandatory death penalty; but
that has its own problems (as we have seen). Besides, what the Baldus
study did show was that when the crime was sufficiently serious and the
person accused of the crime had a significant criminal background,
179.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
( Considering the race of a defendant or victim in deciding if the death penalty should
be imposed is completely at odds with this concern that an individual be evaluated as a
unique human being. Decisions influenced by race rest in part on a categorical
assessment of the worth of human beings according to color, insensitive to whatever
qualities the individuals in question may possess. ).
180.
Id. at 287; David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski
Jr., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from
Georgia, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1399 406 (1985).
181.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 94.
182.
Id. ( Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey
must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He
offers no evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial
considerations played a part in his sentence. ).
183.
Id. at 297.
184.
Id. at 311.
185.
Id.
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juries tended to converge on a sentence of death, regardless of the races
of the victim and the perpetrator.186 McCleskey s case, in fact, was one
of those types of cases: he had killed a police officer during a robbery
of a furniture store.187 We might be able to say with some confidence
that the death penalty in McCleskey s case was not, in fact, morally
arbitrary, even though there was a black perpetrator and a white victim,
contra whatever some (generic) studies might indicate.
But even this last point shows the risk of intrinsic arbitrariness,
something highlighted by Justice Stevens in his dissent in McCleskey.188
It is true, there are some cases where jurors will tend to agree no
matter what race the victim and the perpetrator are. But then there are
a so-called intermediate range of cases where race probably does
have an influence, and so there is a risk of intrinsic arbitrariness, that
is, the risk that race may play a role in giving someone death when they
in fact deserve life.189 Of course, the studies suggest that only this may
happen in any individual case, and that we cannot know, in fact,
whether it was a factor in any individual case. But this is not a decisive
objection. In Furman, the Court did not require proof that the jury in
any given case had acted arbitrarily.190 The problem was the system as
it was structured left too much to chance in a large number of cases.
States had to reform their systems accordingly, to reduce the extent of
the risk. Justice Stevens, in his McCleskey dissent, drew the same
conclusion in the case of the risk of racial bias:
One of the lessons of the Baldus study is that there exist
certain categories of extremely serious crimes for which
prosecutors consistently seek, and juries consistently impose,
the death penalty without regard to the race of the victim or
the race of the offender. If Georgia were to narrow the class
of death-eligible defendants to those categories, the danger of
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty
would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated. As
JUSTICE BRENNAN has demonstrated in his dissenting opinion,
such a restructuring of the sentencing scheme is surely not too
high a price to pay.191
In other words, the problem with race playing an unjustified role
in sentencing can be looked as parallel to the problem of any other

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 285.
Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 324 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Thanks to Joe Welling for this observation.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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arbitrary factor playing an unjustified role, and measures can be taken
to limit that arbitrariness, specifically by focusing only on those most
serious crimes where jurors will tend to decide on the relevant facts and
circumstances, and not on the arbitrary factors such as race. We could,
as well, decide based on the risk of arbitrariness that we should
eliminate the death penalty or, instead, make it mandatory.
The above assumes cases where race may come in and tip the
balance in favor of an unjustified sentence that is, it looks at cases
where race may play a role in increasing the risk of what I have called
intrinsic arbitrariness. What of the case where race acts as a factor in
the decision-making of a juror faced with a person who may in fact
deserve death? Suppose that we have a case where a jury has found an
aggravating factor or two (and let us further assume they are serious
ones) and the suspect has a long criminal record. And now suppose that
race for the jury really does do work in their decision: that because the
suspect is of a certain race, the jury has decided to vote for the death
penalty, where if the suspect was of another race, they would have
voted for life. This involves a morally arbitrary determination, but it
does not offend against intrinsic arbitrariness. Why not? We have
assumed that death would be an appropriate decision in this case, at
least a morally permissible one. But it seems clear that we can find
something wrong with the jury s decision, and that is because the factor
being used for choosing death over life is itself an objectionable one. It
is racist! Not offending intrinsic arbitrariness is not the only way a jury
can be in the wrong they can make an otherwise justified decision
unjustified if they use a factor to tip the decision that it is wrong to use,
even if that decision tracks what might be deserved in any given case.192
The Court has been clear in its recent decisions that race occupies such
a notorious place in our history that we should go out of our way to
avoid it making any difference in the criminal justice system.193
192.
As Brennan emphasized in his dissent, id. at 341 ( That a decision to
impose the death penalty could be influenced by race is thus a particularly repugnant
prospect, and evidence that race may play even a modest role in levying a death
sentence should be enough to characterize that sentence as cruel and unusual. ).
193.
It is worth quoting the Court s recent holding in Pena-Rodriguez at some
length:
The unmistakable principle underlying these precedents is that
discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially
pernicious in the administration of justice. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
555, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979). The jury is to be a criminal
defendant s fundamental protection of life and liberty against race or color
prejudice.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95
L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (quoting Strauder, supra, at 309). Permitting racial
prejudice in the jury system damages both the fact and the perception of
the jury s role as a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by
the State. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113
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Does this get us any closer to understanding the wrong of extrinsic
arbitrariness? I do not think so. The wrongness of race playing a factor,
I think, can be almost wholly exhausted by two explanations, neither of
which are explained by the wrongness of extrinsic arbitrariness. First,
race wrongly plays a factor if it results in an unjust sentence being
passed down, or even if it increases the risk that an unjust sentence will
be passed down. If a person who should have gotten life gets death
because of his race, or if the current sentencing scheme means that this
possibility is a real one, then this is a problem but it is a problem that
can be explained in terms of intrinsic arbitrariness. Second, it may be
that any use of race by the jury is problematic, even when a person may
deserve death and gets death. If race somehow plays a factor even
counterfactually, so that a jury would have given a white defendant
only life in prison this seems odious and wrong. But and this is the
important point the wrongness of using race in this way goes to the
wrongness of using race as a factor, not on anything having to do with
the arbitrary nature of the decision.194 This goes back to Justice
Douglas s point in his opinion in Furman. Discrimination is wrong by
itself, it does not need to be explained further in terms of extrinsic
arbitrariness. If we are using race to explain what is wrong extrinsic
arbitrariness, we need to start again. The problem with using race as a
factor is usually best explained simply in terms of wrongness of using
race as a factor. It is true that sometimes it also means that justice is
not done, because race may lead to an unjust sentence. We are still
searching, however, for an explanation of why it may be bad for a jury
to choose life for one person based on a non-desert based factor other
than race (because race seems like a factor that should never be used,
whether or not it tracks desert). We are still searching, that is, for an
explanation of what is wrong with extrinsic arbitrariness.

L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); cf. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 315, 51
S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931); Buck v. Davis, ante, at 22.
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).
194.
A point made well by Mary Newcomer:
Furthermore, suppose that the decision to afford mercy was based on the
fact that the defendant was white. In such a case, one would not hesitate to
recognize that the system as a whole, and thus each affirmative death
penalty decision made within the system, is tainted by consideration of the
race of the defendant--a factor that is universally recognized as an
impermissible consideration in death penalty decisions.
Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty in an International Context, 45 DUKE L.J. 611,
643 (1995). Newcomer is using arbitrary (in the title to her essay) in the sense hinted
at above where race is a morally arbitrary because it relates neither to the character
of the defendant nor the nature or circumstances of the crime.
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B. Extrinsic Arbitrariness: Bad Lawyering

In a classic article on the death penalty, Stephen Bright famously
asked whether there should not be a death penalty not for the worst
crime but for the worst lawyer. 195 Bright then went on to catalog
various instances of not just bad, but reprehensibly bad lawyering,
made all the more galling because a person s life is at stake. The larger
point Bright was making was that who lived and who died frequently
depended on the adequacy of one s counsel. A good lawyer could mean
that, no matter how bad you were or how bad your crime, you would
be spared the death penalty. A bad lawyer might mean that, even if you
did not commit the crime, you might be subject to execution. As Bright
wrote, Arbitrary results, which are all too common in death penalty
cases, frequently stem from inadequacy of counsel. The process of
sorting out who is most deserving of society s ultimate punishment does
not work when the most fundamental component of the adversary
system, competent representation by counsel, is missing. 196 In a
footnote, Bright quotes from a dissent in a Mississippi Supreme Court
case, seemingly with approval, that making death depend on the quality
of one s counsel exemplified arbitrariness at its worst: We can think
of no more arbitrary factor than having nimbleness of counsel on points
of procedure determine whether Alvin Hill lives or dies, the court
said.197 And Bright is certainly correct in his assessment. Having a good
lawyer can make the difference in death penalty cases, as it can make a
difference in a lot of cases. The seminal decision on adequacy of
counsel, Strickland v. Washington,198 was a death penalty case, and for
good reason.199 When the stakes are the highest, and making sure your
client gets every procedural protection he or she is entitled to, an
effective lawyer is critically important. And sometimes, given the
reality of the modern day public defender system, whether you get even
a minimally competent lawyer, even in a death penalty case, can
frequently be a matter of chance.
Why is having a bad lawyer bad? The answer may be obvious, but
it is important to be clear on this point. Bright is saying that bad
lawyers make the imposition of the death penalty arbitrary. 200 What
195.
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
196.
Id. at 1837.
197.
Id. at 1837 n.160 (quoting Hill v. State, 432 S.2d 792, 801 (Miss. 1983)
(Robertson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
198.
466 U.S. 688 (1984).
199.
Id. at 693.
200.
Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the
Eighth Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1997) ( The arbitrariness problem
takes root at the earliest pretrial stages of a capital prosecution, when an attorney is
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does he mean by this? The first thing he could mean is that having a
good or bad lawyer may make the difference between whether a person
who does not deserve the death penalty gets the death penalty. A bad
lawyer (or even a good lawyer, improperly trained) may so mess things
up that a person who is wholly innocent of the crime is sentenced to
death. This would be a case where the values of intrinsic arbitrariness
are implicated, and an extreme one.201 But there are less extreme cases
that do not involve claims of innocence. Having a good lawyer may be
what makes it possible for a person who does not deserve death to
adequately explain why he does not deserve death. A good attorney
could raise (and investigate) issues that would be relevant to the jury s
assessment of the circumstances of the crime or the character of the
offender. A bad attorney would not. And this difference would make
the difference between life and death, and more importantly, it would
make the difference between a person who does not deserve the death
penalty getting death and not getting death. So while a good or bad
attorney does not go directly to whether one deserves the death penalty,
it can be importantly related to desert. Having a good attorney will
make it more likely that the process works in effectively separating
those who deserve death and those who do not. So one may believe that
intrinsic arbitrariness is the only thing that matters, yet still be
concerned about adequate counsel as a means to making sure that only
those who deserve death get it and especially that those who do not
deserve death do not get the death penalty.
I should be clear here that desert in the legal context can and
should be construed broadly. Guilt is not just moral guilt; it is legal
guilt as well, and maybe even especially.202 So if a good attorney would
be able to argue that some evidence evidence that shows conclusively
that a person is the killer should be suppressed and a bad attorney
could not, then this too is relevant to whether one has gotten the death
penalty when one did not deserve it. One deserves the death penalty, in
the sense of legally deserves, when the evidence the state is entitled to
present proves beyond a reasonable doubt both that one did the crime
and that one deserves to die for it. If an attorney can argue that you did
not do the crime, or that your character is not of the sort that you
deserve to die for what you did, or that some procedural protection
means that the state cannot prove you deserve the death penalty, then
the attorney has demonstrated that you do not deserve to die. So it is in
appointed to represent the customarily indigent defendant, and continues throughout the
trial and direct appeal. ).
201.
Of course, even a good lawyer may face a struggle to prove a client is in
fact innocent of his or her crime.
202.
Again, as I have emphasized above, I am assuming we can give sense to
the concepts of legal and moral desert.

114

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

a very broad sense that having a good attorney can be relevant to
whether or not you get the death penalty. A good attorney can not only
effectively present your moral claims as to the deservingness of the
death penalty, he or she can also effectively make any legal arguments
as to whether the state is entitled, based on the evidence presented, to
sentence you to death. Both of these go to desert (broadly speaking) so
again, having a good attorney can reduce the chance that a person who
does not deserve death will be executed which is, again, a matter of
whether the death penalty allows jurors to make judgments that would
present a risk of intrinsic arbitrariness. In the words of Strickland, good
attorneys give us confidence in the justness of the result that the
person really deserved the punishment he got, and not some other
punishment.203
The force of the idea that bad lawyers make the death penalty
arbitrary in its application comes from the fact that a bad lawyer can
make the difference as to whether a person who does not deserve death
actually gets death. If we agree with that, then we can effectively
criticize the Court s current jurisprudence on effective assistance of
counsel as doing a terrible job of assuring that this is actually the case
(as Bright does). The standard is too low, we may think, if the goal is
to provide defendants with the ability to show that they do not actually
deserve the death penalty. In other words, the objection that the death
penalty is arbitrary because it depends on whether you have a good
lawyer is really just a version of the idea that there is too much risk of
intrinsic arbitrariness in the system. Again, having a good lawyer
seems to be rather necessary for the jury to do its job of filtering out
those who deserve death and those who do not.
But we should not confuse the arbitrariness of whether or not you
get a good lawyer with intrinsic arbitrariness. It could, after all, be the
case that you got a bad lawyer and you deserve the death penalty (both
morally and legally). In some cases, a good or bad lawyer would not
have made a difference in the outcome. We can argue about how large
this class of cases is, but it does not remove the analytical point. Still,
we might think that you still deserve a good lawyer, even if you are
bound to lose anyway. This is the case, of course, because we often do
not know in advance who is bound to lose. The goodness of a good
lawyer may be that he or she is able to take bound to lose cases and
make them close cases and even turn some into wins. But more
fundamentally, we might think that a good lawyer is just something you
deserve. You deserve it even if your case is a slam-dunk loser. That is,
203.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 ( The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result. ).
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you deserve a good lawyer, even if you deserve to die for your crime.
So we should be careful to separate two things. First, you deserve a
good lawyer because a good lawyer can help press your claims that you
do not deserve a certain punishment. Second, you deserve a good
lawyer because that is your right. Getting a bad lawyer can thus be bad
for two reasons, in other words. First, a bad lawyer may make it the
case that you get a punishment that you do not deserve. Second, getting
a bad lawyer is just bad in its own right, because even bad people who
have done bad things deserve to have a good lawyer.
We might think that there is another thing that is bad about having
an ineffective lawyer and it is this: a good lawyer may be able to get a
jury to sentence a person who deserves the death penalty as a matter of
legal and moral guilt to something less than death. That is, suppose we
have a person who has the good lawyer he deserves and he is able to
get less than death even though a jury could rightly and properly make
the judgment that the person should be executed for his crime. This
would be an example of effective counsel making a difference in an
extrinsic way. That is, we have stipulated that the person really is
eligible to get the death penalty that there is no good legal or moral
reason given a Gregg-type scheme why the person should not die.
Death, in this case, would not be an unjust result. Still, the attorney for
the defendant is able to persuade the jury to give the person only a life
sentence. We can even stipulate further that if the person had a not-asgood lawyer he would have gotten death. Maybe the jury just likes the
attorney and wants to please her by treating her client well. In a case
like this, the wrong (if there is a wrong) with the sentence of life as
opposed to the sentence of death is that it has been made in the last
instance on a factor extrinsic to matters of desert. I am not yet in a
position to say what is wrong with this if there is anything wrong with
it but it helps that we have narrowed the class of cases where we can
say a result has been extrinsically arbitrary. It can be confusing in the
case of counsel precisely because a lot of why counsel is good is
because good counsel makes results less likely to be intrinsically
arbitrary, and good counsel is something defendants have a right to.
There are bad things about having bad counsel that are not a matter of
extrinsic arbitrariness. Indeed, I would say that most of what is bad
about having bad counsel is quite apart from any risk of extrinsic
arbitrariness. Of course, this is not to say that extrinsic arbitrariness is
not also bad, but at this point the nature of its badness is still unclear
especially if our worry is that a good lawyer may sometimes mean a
bad person does not die, even when he or she can be said to deserve to
die.
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C. Extrinsic Arbitrariness: Geography

The last two examples were not terribly helpful in explaining why
extrinsic arbitrariness might be bad, because it turned out that the
badness of having race factor into jury decisions and having a bad
lawyer influence the outcome of a case could be explained by things
other than what I have been calling extrinsic arbitrariness. First, in
both cases, race and bad lawyering might have the upshot that a person
was given a punishment he or she did not deserve, in particular, a
person might be given the death penalty when only life in prison was
deserved. Race might influence a jury to give death rather than life, and
a bad lawyer might not raise legitimate claims of mitigation, say
which would enable a person to get the sentence that he or she deserve.
So the arbitrary fact that one did not get a good lawyer, or that the
perpetrator was black and his or her victim was white could be bad
insofar as they raised the risk that the sentence would be intrinsically
arbitrary. Second, having race play a role in jury decision making or
having a bad attorney are bad things in themselves. Juries should not be
making decisions on race, even a little bit, and people are entitled to
have an adequate lawyer in their defense. Whether, if either of these
things happens, the sentence should be void is a separate question, of
course. It does not seem as obvious to me that this is the case, as
opposed to when one gets a sentence that one does not deserve. Still,
we can see not having a lawyer and as having race influence a jury as
themselves bad even if one gets the sentence one deserves. So what we
are looking for is a factor that may play a role in whether or not one
gets the death penalty, but that does not seem inherently wrong to be
playing a role. Moreover, to focus just on extrinsic rather than intrinsic
arbitrariness, we would need a case where a person may in fact deserve
the death penalty, so that there is no question as to whether intrinsic
arbitrariness is really doing the work in explaining the badness of why a
certain extrinsic factor has influenced the jury s decision-making.
One factor which may seem to fit the bill would be the effect of
geography on who gets the death penalty.204 And as it happens, the role
of geography figures prominently in Justice Breyer s forceful dissent in
the recent Glossip v. Gross205 case, and Breyer in turn relies on recent
scholarly work in this area by Rob Smith.206 The argument goes
204.
See Hubbard, supra note 100, at 1131.
205.
135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
206.
Id. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ( Geography also plays an important
role in determining who is sentenced to death. ); Robert J. Smith, The Geography of
the Death Penalty and its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 231 32 (2012). Breyer
has also emphasized geography in some of his more recent dissents from denials of
certiorari. See Jordan v. Mississippi, 138 S. Ct. 2567, 2570 (2018); Reed v. Louisiana,
137 S. Ct. 787, 197 (2017) ( The arbitrary role that geography plays in the imposition
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something like this. It turns out that it is a small number of counties
that are responsible for most of the death sentences in America. Note
that it is not just a matter of states that are responsible for death
sentences rather, we can go even more granular than that. We can go
to particular counties, which in some cases, are responsible for more
death sentences than most states. Prosecutors in these areas will just
more aggressively pursue death, just as a sort of default. As Breyer
summarizes the research:
Geography also plays an important role in determining who is
sentenced to death. . . . And that is not simply because some
States permit the death penalty while others do not. Rather
within a death penalty State, the imposition of the death
penalty heavily depends on the county in which a defendant is
tried. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and its
Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 227, 231 232 (2012)
(hereinafter Smith); see also Donohue, supra, at 673 ( [T]he
single most important influence from 1973 2007 explaining
whether a death-eligible defendant [in Connecticut] would be
sentenced to death was whether the crime occurred in
Waterbury [County] ). Between 2004 and 2009, for example,
just 29 counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country)
accounted for approximately half of all death sentences
imposed nationwide. . . . And in 2012, just 59 counties
(fewer than 2% of counties in the country) accounted for all
death sentences imposed nationwide. DPIC, The 2% Death
Penalty: How A Minority of Counties Produce Most Death
Cases At Enormous Costs to All 9 (Oct. 2013). 207
And so one may say that whether or not one is faced with the
possibility of a death sentence will turn out to be a matter of whether or
not you committed a crime in one of these counties (and with this
prosecutor with this budget208) as opposed to almost anywhere else in
of the death penalty, along with the other serious problems I have previously described,
has led me to conclude that the Court should consider the basic question of the death
penalty s constitutionality. ); see also Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death Penalty
Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: International Norms, Discrimination,
Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1, 15 ( As a
result of the enormous discretion given prosecutors, the death penalty is also a matter of
place. ). As Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier has noted, however, [t]he Supreme Court . . . has
never indicated that the Eighth Amendment requires consistency among the states in
their use of the death penalty. Kirchmeier, supra note 19, at 387.
207.
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2761.
208.
See Ashley Rupp, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and
County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on
County Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735, 2767 (2003) ( If the above data indicate
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America. Breyer cites the prominent role that geography plays in who
gets the death penalty as an improper factor, alongside race and
class.209 It is a circumstance which ought not affect the application of
the death penalty. The research shows, Breyer says, that the death
penalty is imposed arbitrarily. 210
Again, we have to be careful to isolate what exactly arbitrariness
means in this context, and why it is wrong. If the death penalty in some
of these counties is being pursued by prosecutors when it is not
deserved, then we have a problem, but it is the obvious and by now
familiar problem of intrinsic arbitrariness. If a zealous prosecutor in
Maricopa County211 is going for death in cases where a person has not
committed an aggravated murder or when a person has overwhelming
mitigating factors that counsel against death, then the objection to this is
obvious: the prosecutor should not go for death in cases where it is not
deserved. Something needs to change. But this is not a problem of
geography per se playing an unjustified role, at least not directly. It is
more immediately a problem of a morally flawed prosecutor. Again,
geography may be a sort of proxy as to where we can find a greater
risk of intrinsic arbitrariness, but this does not show that geography
itself is the problem.
But is there something wrong with the fact that some prosecutors
more zealously pursue the death penalty within the bounds of Gregg? If
there was, this could be a case of showing what was wrong with
extrinsic arbitrariness. Suppose we have two people who commit the
same crime and have roughly the same priors, but one is caught in a
county with a zealous death-minded prosecutor and one is caught with a
prosecutor who has basically vowed not to pursue death except in the
most extreme cases. One is sentenced to death and the other is not, but
let us assume that both could permissibly have been sentenced to death,
but for the discretion of the prosecutors in each county. What is the
problem here? A non-desert factor is playing a role in who gets death,
not at the level of the jury (such as when race may influence a jury s
decision) and not at the level of defense counsel (where a bad lawyer

a causal relationship between county budget allocations and prosecutorial charging
decisions, then the death penalty is being arbitrarily applied. ).
209.
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2763.
210.
Id.
211.
Michael Kiefer, Maricopa County Runs Out Of Death-Penalty Defense
(Mar.
26,
2017),
CENT.
Attorneys,
AZ
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2017/03/26/deathpenalty-cases-maricopa-county-attorney-bill-montgomery/99238852/
[https://perma.cc/QQB3-4CS2] ( In the past two fiscal years, the County Attorney s
Office has filed more death penalty cases than it has resolved. And by January, there
were so many potential capital cases that the county ran out of specialized attorneys to
defend them. ).
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may make the difference between a life sentence and the death penalty)
but at the level of the prosecutor choosing to go for death. Intrinsic
arbitrariness is not at play, nor does it seem that we have a factor
geography which is itself morally objectionable. Indeed, I am not sure
there is a problem if some prosecutors consistently recommend much
less egregious cases for death than others, provided that they do not
violate intrinsic arbitrariness in doing so. There can be variations in
which prosecutors pursue death, so long as those who do pursue death
are doing so in ways in which it would be permissible for other
prosecutors to do so. But this is just another way of saying that the
relevant constraint here is intrinsic arbitrariness, not some constraint of
geographical uniformity.212
If we start looking at geography in the way Breyer does, we can of
course see many other reasons why some counties will prosecute more
than others.213 There may be different political pressures in those
counties. There may be different crime rates. It may be that the police
in some countries are just better at catching criminals than the police in
others. Some governors may be more willing to commute death
sentences in some states than in other states. Juries may be more
willing to impose death in some places rather than others. All of these
things will matter to where people get put to death and where they do
not. Is it wrong that there are variations like this? If we stipulate that in
each case the person can be said to deserve death, then I do not think
there is a problem. It does not seem in itself objectionable that there be
geographical variations, and that this may affect whether one gets death
or not as opposed to the inherent objectionableness of race playing a
factor. No one has a right to a merciful governor, in the way that one
has a right to a good lawyer. To eliminate geographical variation totally
we would have to go a long way toward eliminating our system of
government. Now, that might be worth it, if it turned out that
geographical variation permitted real risks of intrinsic arbitrariness. We
might say, then, that giving prosecutors discretion that was unlimited
was a failed experiment in the same way that giving juries too much
discretion was a failed experiment. But I do not see this. That is, I do
not see that the Gregg system, by allowing there to be geographical
variation, represents an intolerable risk of intrinsic arbitrariness.

212.
One could certainly say that too many people are getting death even given
the Court s constraints on the death penalty, but (again) this is a point about intrinsic
arbitrariness.
213.
See also the decision by the Washington Supreme Court in State v.
Gregory, 427 P.3d 621 (Wash. 2018), which lists several types of geographical
arbitrariness.
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D. Mercy

I conclude that the inherent wrongness of extrinsic arbitrariness
remains something of a mystery. I agree that there is a sense in which it
is somehow wrong and that, ideally, it should not be there. Those
concerns may seem magnified in the context of the fact that the
punishment we are dealing with is death, and as the Court has
emphasized in countless ways, death is different. 214 The nagging
concern with extrinsic arbitrariness may lead us to condemn the death
penalty altogether, although I suspect that it is not a sufficient reason on
its own to reject the death penalty.215 I deal with this possibility in my
conclusion. In this section, I need to briefly consider a confounding
factor that may lead one to qualify an absolute condemnation of
extrinsic arbitrariness. From one angle, extrinsic arbitrariness looks to
add a level of arbitrariness into the decision to give someone the death
penalty. And perhaps there should be no room for any kind of
arbitrariness, even when we are dealing with a person who can be said
to deserve the death penalty. But from another angle, if we do have the
death penalty, and there is a more or less well-defined class of people
who can be said to deserve it, then we may want to reserve some power
to the jury to make a decision that is not fully rational. That is, we
might want to give the jury an out, even when it decides that the
crime is aggravated, the person has a bad character, and there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to outweigh either the badness of the crime
or the badness of the person who committed it. In those cases, we may
speak of the jury being merciful. And mercy, at least on some
definitions, is just arbitrary.216 It can be given for no reason at all. It is
gratuitous.
So the fact that two juries can take two people equally deserving of
death and in one case sentence a person to death and in another case
214.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ( While Furman did not
hold that the infliction of the death penalty per se violates the Constitution s ban on
cruel and unusual punishments, it did recognize that the penalty of death is different in
kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice. ). See
generally BLACK, supra note 10, 38 45 (arguing for the specialness of death).
215.
It could also be a reason to favor a mandatory death penalty.
216.
Indeed, this was paradoxically part of the defendant s argument in Gregg;
that the death penalty, even after the post-Furman reforms, was still too arbitrary,
because grants of mercy could be (arbitrarily) given. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 200
( Specifically, Gregg urges that the statutory aggravating circumstances are too broad
and too vague, that the sentencing procedure allows for arbitrary grants of mercy, and
that the scope of the evidence and argument that can be considered at the presentence
hearing is too wide. ); see generally Stephen P. Garvey, As the Gentle Rain from
Heaven : Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1040 (1996). I have
also considered similar themes in Chad Flanders, Pardons and the Theory of the
Second-Best, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1559 (2013).
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sentence a person to life in prison can be seen not as extrinsic
arbitrariness (although it is that) but as an exercise of mercy. The same
can be applied to the exercise of a prosecutor s discretion and, as
classically applied, to the exercise of a governor s power to commute
sentences. They are all ways of sparing a person from a fate he or she
can be said to deserve. Of course, commutations, etc., can also be used
to spare a person from a fate he or she does not deserve. Discretion can
be used to remove intrinsic arbitrariness and in these cases, we should
say that the exercise of such discretion is not just discretionary, but in
fact mandatory.217 But there are classes of cases where mercy is up to
the decision-making body. Whether or not we view mercy as good
depends crucially on how we look at it. If we are beneficiaries of
mercy a lower sentence when a greater one was deserved mercy can
look quite good. When someone gets mercy and we do not, and we are
similarly situated, mercy can look quite unfair. The basis for this
unfairness, however, is also something of a mystery. To take a related
case: can we complain at not being pardoned when someone else has
been pardoned, who was just like us?218 It would seem not.219 After all,
we can concede, in cases where both deserve the punishment, the
person pardoned did not deserve to be pardoned. And it would seem
strange to say that no one should be pardoned because the pardons were
not distributed fairly. The alternative to this, assuming that we accept
the death penalty as a legitimate punishment, would be that everyone
who deserved to be punished with death got death. We are back to the
position that Woodson rejected, but now we can see a further reason to
reject a mandatory death penalty. Woodson thought it would be difficult
to craft a rule where we could be sure that everyone who committed a
certain crime and had a certain character should automatically get the
death penalty. Better to let the jury engage in individualized
assessment. But now we can add that getting rid of a mandatory death
penalty gives the jury not only a chance to make a fine-tuned judgment
as to desert, but also to exercise mercy even in cases where it has found
that the death penalty is deserved.220

217.
See Flanders, supra note 216, at 1570 71.
218.
Id. at 1578 ( Do gifts have to be distributed equally, or not at all? ).
219.
Matthew C. Altman, Arbitrariness and the California Death Penalty, 14
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217, 224 (2016) ( Inmates who are executed are not getting more
than they deserve, even though some inmates-those who are not executed-are getting
less than they deserve. ).
220.
As the Court said in Gregg:
Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an
individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution. Furman held only
that, in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed
on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had
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There are, however, going to be problematic instances of mercy,
which I have talked about it another context, and so won t belabor
here.221 Suppose a jury decides that a person deserves death, but they
are going to spare him because he is white. Such an exercise of mercy
seems wrong, because it is based on a morally odious reason. Why
should a person be spared just because he is white? In these cases, we
may find that the desire for equitable punishment outweighs the good
mysterious, to be sure of mercy. There are probably other factors like
this as well, where we would say that the basis for being merciful
corrupts and debases the very exercise of mercy. Perhaps certain
reasons make it problematic even to use the term mercy ; deciding to
spare someone because he is white speaks of a sort of crude racial
chauvinism rather than some elevated sentiment like mercy. It could be,
too, that articulating any basis for mercy that is in no way related to
desert he had a nice smile, he was from a small town makes mercy
seem suspect. Again, I do not want to deny the strangeness of mercy.
At the same time, I do not think it is altogether out of place to talk
about juries exercising mercy. Doubtless, some have, and many will
continue to do so. The point is that we cannot automatically condemn
those exercises of arbitrary judgment as bad, because from another
angle, they may seem good especially to those whose lives are
spared.222
CONCLUSION
I have made many claims in this article, but they can be resolved
into essentially two. The first, a historical and normative claim, is that
the Supreme Court has in much of its jurisprudence surrounding the
death penalty, been concerned with what I have been calling intrinsic
arbitrariness, or the risk that someone who does not deserve death
(who deserves, instead, something less, such as a life sentence) might
get it. Moreover, the Supreme Court has, I think, reduced the risk of
intrinsic arbitrariness by both its endorsement of schemes of guided
discretion and also by eliminating certain crimes and certain classes of
people from death-eligibility.223 My second claim has been that there
to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on
the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
221.
See generally Flanders, supra note 216.
222.
Cf. BLACK, supra note 10, at 84 ( For clemency knows no standards that
are invocable as a matter of law. To the saved, this is mercy, of a quality not strained.
To those who learn they are to die, it is irrational choice for death the final such
choice in a long series. ).
223.
This is of course an empirical claim; I could be wrong. What seems
clearer, however, is that this is what the Court sees itself as doing. But see McCord,

2019:55

What Makes the Death Penalty Arbitrary?

123

exists another kind of arbitrariness that we can call extrinsic
arbitrariness. Extrinsic arbitrariness is when a jury or some other
decision-making body decides who should get death according to a
factor other than the circumstances of the crime or the character of the
offender. Importantly, I have tried to emphasize that there can be cases
of extrinsic arbitrariness even when the offender can be said to deserve
his or her sentence, that is, deserves death. These cases are important,
because many times when lawyers or scholars attack judgments on the
ground that the decision was due to a bad lawyer or made on racial
grounds, they may be simply using that factor as proxy for the fact that
someone has gotten a punishment he or she did not deserve. But this is
an attack on the possibility of intrinsic arbitrariness, not an objection to
extrinsic arbitrariness as such. Another way in which extrinsic
arbitrariness may just be a stand in for another value is when a
particular factor is objectionable in itself such as race so what is
being criticized is the use of this factor in making the decision, not
merely the use of a non-desert factor. My conclusion about extrinsic
arbitrariness is that it is probably not a bad thing after we strip away
and just look at extrinsic arbitrariness by itself, and not when it is used
as a proxy for something else. Moreover, there are cases that I think
we can see the ability of the jury to make an extrinsically arbitrary
decision for life as a good thing: those are the cases when we say that
the jury (or a prosecutor or a governor) has been merciful.
This conclusion may seem too strong, especially because we may
think that in the case of death that really any trace of arbitrariness
should be removed. But we have to be careful in parsing this objection.
Is it an objection that the current way of applying the death penalty
does not get at the worst of the worst and instead gives us something
like a death lottery ? But what does this objection mean in the
abstract? To give this objection some purchase, we would need some
cases where a person has gotten the death penalty and it seems plausible
that he or she did not deserve it. Even better would be to supply some
aggravating circumstances or evidence of bad character that should not
figure into assessing the death penalty. To give example like these
would show that there are in fact cases where the death penalty is
deserved, but that the statutory schemes of states do not adequately
capture only these cases. I have suggested just one such example earlier
in this paper, in Arizona s death penalty scheme. It allows the use of a
stun gun in a killing to be used as an aggravating factor and more than
that, a certain type of stun gun. This seems to allow the jury to impose
death in a case instead of life in a way that violates intrinsic
arbitrariness. If only the worst deserve to die, and the system is killing
supra note 109. McCord s conclusion that the Court has reduced the risk of
overinclusiveness in the administration of the death penalty strikes me as persuasive.
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people who are not objectively the worst, then we have an obvious
(and obviously identifiable) problem. The truly objectionable death
lottery is one which kills people indiscriminately and not on the basis of
desert at all.224 But we do not have such a system.225
At the same time, it would not seem to me completely wrong if the
jury after finding several other aggravating circumstances and no
countervailing mitigators to use the stun gun as a tie-breaker in favor of
death. It does not seem to me a wholly arbitrary factor. But it does not
seem to me so related to desert as to be, taken by itself, the basis for
imposing death. In the absence of consideration of particular
aggravating circumstances and their inadequacy as aggravating factors,
the idea that the death penalty is arbitrary does not get much traction.
Even in cases where race or a bad lawyer has been a factor in a person
getting the death penalty, there may still be overwhelming evidence of
guilt. In those cases, there is also an obvious objection, but it is not
objection of arbitrariness it is an objection based on the idea of using
race as a factor, or the injustice of not having a good lawyer. In the
latter instance, I am not sure how much of an objection it in fact is. If
we are sure that the goodness of the badness of the lawyer did not
affect whether a person got a penalty he or she did not deserve, there
does not seem to be a convincing moral objection to assessing that

224.
Again, one could object that our current constraints on the risk of
intrinsic arbitrariness are not constraining enough but (as I go on to argue below) then
one must say in what ways we need to constrain the process more.
225.
Is a death lottery per se objectionable even among the guilty and
deserving of death? See David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes Evidence from the
Popular Press That Death Sentencing Continues to Be Unconstitutionally Arbitrary
More Than Three Decades After Furman, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 797, 808 n.3 (elaborating
on lottery metaphor); see also John D. Bessler, The Concept of "Unusual Punishments"
in Anglo-American Law: The Death Penalty As Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel
and Unusual, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 307, 378 (2018) ( state-sanctioned killing in
the U.S. now resembles a corrupted, state-sponsored lottery system ). We might think
so. A few points will have to suffice in reply. First, the jury is not a pure lottery it
involves human beings making choices. The idea of a lottery may seem objectionable
because one imagines putting people s fates in the hands of something impersonal. But
that is not what we have. (One may similarly recoil at the image of just a single
person a King, perhaps deciding on a whim who lives or dies; but that is not what
we have, either). Second, there are aspects of any human endeavor that will be like a
lottery, and the criminal justice system is no exception. It will be to some extent a
matter of chance whether a person gets caught, gets prosecuted, gets convicted, and
gets sentenced to death. See, on this point, BLACK supra note 10, passim. If one were
to try to eliminate chance altogether then there could be no criminal justice system (or
any other human-designed and operated process for that matter). Finally, as I point out
below, one solution to a death lottery is to make death mandatory for certain crimes.
But I suspect those who object to the idea of a lottery do not endorse this particular
solution. For further reflections on the lottery metaphor, see Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante
Fairness in Criminal Law and Procedure, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 277 (2012).
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penalty.226 With race, of course, things are different, and I am
sympathetic to the claim that if the death penalty is imposed on the
basis of race even when the punishment was deserved then the penalty is
unjust. Again, however, this is not a case of objecting to the death
penalty on the basis of sheer arbitrariness it is a case of objecting to
racism in the criminal justice system. With geography, I am at a bit of
a loss to explain why sheer geographical variation alone should be
objectionable in any given case, so long as the intrinsic arbitrariness
constraint is satisfied.
I used the phrase the worst of the worst, in the previous
paragraph, and I have on occasion employed a variation of that phrase
in the body of the paper.227 We might think that if, in the final instance,
a sentence of death is ever assessed because of a factor extrinsic to a
person s desert (the circumstances of the crime or the character of the
offender) the death penalty is not justified. It should be desert all the
way down and what is more it should be given to the worst of the
offenders (again measured by desert).228 But the worst of the worst is
a hard phrase to get a handle on. In any group, we can always whittle
things down to the worst of the worst, at least in theory. In the real
world, as opposed to hypotheticals, there will always be subtle
gradations of badness. So even in the case of only two people, there
will be a worst among them one of the two will be more bad than the
other. The objection cannot be that we must isolate the one worst
person and only he or she can deserve the death penalty. Rather, the
idea behind the Supreme Court s jurisprudence is that there is a class of
people who deserve death, and among those, the death penalty is a
permissible punishment for them. They all have to meet a certain level
of reprehensibleness, and if they do, the death penalty can be applied.
The fact that some within that class are worse than others may be true,
but it is not directly to the point the punishment can be imposed if you
meet a threshold, not if you are the very worst among those who meet
the threshold.229 It is a fair objection to the Court s line of decisions that
it has done a bad job of deciding who that class is that there are
226.
The problem is, we may not know when this has happened. This is a
problem, but it is an epistemic problem about being able to know when someone
deserves death not about whether the death penalty is applied in a way that fairly picks
out those who deserve death.
227.
For the most extensive use of this phrase, see McCord, supra note 225,
at 801 n.13. For a discussion of this article, and rebuttal, see Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.
Ct. 2726, 2752 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
228.
For this use of the phrase, see, for example, Vann, supra note 104, at
1271 72.
229.
See generally Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). Note that the
worst of the worst objection is not the same as the objection that one or another
aggravating factor does not really pick out a particular murder as more awful than
others an objection I have endorsed, above.
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aggravators that put people in that class when they don t deserve to be.
This is the problem of intrinsic arbitrariness. But once you are in the
class and rightly so that is, based on proper aggravators without
outweighing mitigators the fact that some are selected for death and
some are not, based on factors extrinsic to desert, does not seem to be a
serious moral problem. Indeed, as I have suggested, it can be seen not
as a bad, but as the positive good of the exercise of mercy.
There remains one point to consider in closing, although I have
suggested it throughout this paper.230 Perhaps the worry about extrinsic
arbitrariness is in fact a disguised version of the complaint that there
really is no way to decide who is truly deserving that no set of
aggravators can pick out the subclass of the worst who deserve to die
rather than who deserve to only get life in prison. Here we get back to
the skepticism of McGautha but in a different form. In McGautha, the
worry was that we could not specify in advance what sorts of things the
jury might consider relevant to deciding who was deserving of death.
The Court in McGautha said this was OK, and that if we were to have
a jury decide sentencing, we had to trust them. We could just as easily
say that we cannot trust the jury with this power, because again we
cannot specify all those things a jury might find relevant, and the risk
of arbitrariness is too great, and the absence of reliable standards too
profound. But this objection seems to me to go too far. Is the death
penalty really just as arbitrary as it was at the time of McGautha? To
say so would be to say that the efforts of the Court to limit the
discretion of jurors by, in many cases, simply taking it away has
been a total failure. To spell this out further, can we say that the death
penalty is just as arbitrary as it was when it could be applied without
the jury having to find aggravators, and when it could be given to
someone who was fifteen or seriously mentally disabled? 231 Either the
objection here really means to specify ways in which jurors should be
limited further, or it is in fact an objection to any method of applying
the death penalty to human beings by human beings. If it is the latter,
then the arbitrariness objection to the death penalty becomes something
like, the death penalty is impermissible because any choice to impose
death is wrong. This is a strong version of intrinsic arbitrariness,
because it says that in every case the imposition of death is undeserved:
no one deserves an immoral punishment. But it would be better in this
case not to present the argument as one of the arbitrary imposition to
the death penalty, if one thought in every instance the death penalty was

230.
See also Sigler, supra note 12.
231.
Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 7, at 436 (asserting that the preFurman world of unreviewable sentencer discretion lives on, with much the same
consequences in terms of arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing patterns ).
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wrong. It would be better to lodge the objection directly, to the death
penalty itself, rather than to the arbitrary manner of its imposition.232

232.
As I have written elsewhere, the best place to look for arguments against
the death penalty is in more substantive notions, like human dignity and
civilization. See Chad Flanders, The Case Against the Case Against the Death
Penalty, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 595, 619 (2013) ( This lack of resources within the
various punishment theories means we have to go elsewhere, to broader normative
territory, to criticize the death penalty. We have to look at ideas of human dignity, or
of decency, or of civilization. ). In the U.S. context, this would mean spelling out how
the death penalty is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency. See id.
At the other end, there is certainly room for case-by-case determinations of the
appropriateness of the death penalty, both as to whether death is deserved, and as in
the recent challenge in Bucklew v. Precythe before the Supreme Court whether a
method of applying the death penalty to a particular person is cruel and unusual. 883
F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2018), aff d, No. 17-18151, 2019 WL 1428884 (U.S. Apr. 1,
2019).

